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Generals & General Elections:
Legal Responses to Partisan
Endorsements by Retired Military
Officers
Retired generals and admirals of the U.S. military appear to be
endorsing partisan political candidates in greater numbers, with more
visibility. This Note argues that the practice represents a clear danger to
civilian control over the military and weakens military effectiveness. It
explains that while retirees remain subject to military jurisdiction, the
existing array of statutory and regulatory restrictions on political
activity cannot adequately address the problem. Neither can
professional norms be expected to shore themselves up to solve it. This
Note describes how political restrictions on servicemembers have evolved
over time in response to novel challenges to civilian control. It illustrates
that retired officers—who receive lifetime pensions and remain subject
to recall—have always been a part of the civilian-control conversation.
It also analogizes to judicial ethics, Hatch Act prohibitions, and
postemployment business ethics restrictions on military retirees, finding
several compelling state interests that could justify narrowly tailored
restraints on retiree speech.
This Note ultimately offers an assortment of potential legal
responses to the endorsement problem. These include modest changes
that others have proposed, such as additional disclaimers, restrictions
on the use of ranks and titles, and rules that would formally ostracize
endorsers from events and partnerships with the active military. The
Note also suggests a more radical last-ditch proposal: officers seeking
promotion to general or admiral would have to agree, as a term of their
employment contract at the highest ranks, to refrain from endorsing
partisan candidates for eight years after retirement. Certainly, retired
flag officer endorsements represent only one symptom of a larger civilmilitary divide in the United States. But this symptom deserves further
study, and not just because of its harmful effects. It serves as a reminder
that while civilian control may be a fundamental, constitutionally
derived principle, it relies on measures beyond the Constitution to
manifest and protect it.
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INTRODUCTION
Timed to coincide with the “Commander-in-Chief Forum” on
NBC,1 then-presidential candidate Donald Trump released a list of
endorsements from eighty-eight retired generals and admirals (“flag
officers”).2 Not to be outdone, Hillary Clinton released her own list the
following day with the names of ninety-five former flag officers,
asserting that this number bested that of any recent Democratic
presidential nominee and pointing out that Trump had received four
hundred fewer such endorsements than Mitt Romney in 2012.3 Both the
Republican and Democratic National Conventions in 2016 featured
outspoken former generals: Michael Flynn gave a speech and led the
Republican crowd in chants of “lock her up”—the “her” being Clinton4—
while John Allen “marched” on the Democratic stage and called on
active servicemembers to vote with him.5
By most accounts, the number and visibility of these kinds of
political endorsements from retired flag officers have escalated in the
past three decades,6 accompanied by an increase in controversy.7 It is
1.
See, e.g., Carrie Dann, 88 Retired Generals and Admirals Endorse Trump, NBC NEWS
(Sept. 6, 2016, 6:14 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/card/88-retired-generals-admirals-endorsetrump-n643251 [https://perma.cc/E2XR-2E8E].
2.
Press Release, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 88 Retired U.S. Generals and
Admirals Endorse Trump (Sept. 6, 2016), https://web.archive.org/web/20160907051243/
https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/88-retired-u.s.-generals-and-admirals-endorsetrump [https://perma.cc/Q2VU-RFNW] (archived copy of the Trump campaign website captured on
Sept. 7, 2016). A copy of the “Open Letter from Military Leaders” can be found at
https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/MILITARY_LETTER.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B8Q-3P6W].
3.
Press Release, Hillary for America, Ninety-Five Retired Generals and Admirals Endorse
Hillary
Clinton
(Sept.
7,
2016),
https://web.archive.org/web/20160908190854/
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/updates/2016/09/07/ninety-five-retired-generals-andadmirals-endorse-hillary-clinton/ [https://perma.cc/5ULN-QYY7] (archived copy of the Clinton
campaign website captured on Sept. 8, 2016).
4.
Peter Feaver, We Don’t Need Generals to Become Cheerleaders at Political Conventions,
FOREIGN POL’Y: SHADOW GOV’T (July 29, 2016, 4:32 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/29/wedont-need-generals-to-become-cheerleaders-at-political-conventions/
[https://perma.cc/LYM23DXX].
5.
Peter Feaver, Controversy Over Military Partisan Cheerleading Continues, FOREIGN
POL’Y: SHADOW GOV’T (Aug. 2, 2016, 5:51 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/02/controversyover-military-partisan-cheerleading-continues/ [https://perma.cc/7NE2-JV25].
6.
See Erik L. Christiansen, Curbing the Trend of Retired General/Flag Officer Political
Endorsements 3 n.6 (Jan. 4, 2017) (unpublished Strategy Research Project),
http://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3407.pdf [https://perma.cc/95WT-H4BA] (reviewing
the literature identifying the increase in retired flag officer endorsements, listing notable
endorsements from 1988 to 2012, and noting that endorsement lists increased in number and
visibility in 2000).
7.
See Martin Dempsey, Keep Your Politics Private, My Fellow Generals and Admirals, DEF.
ONE (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/08/keep-your-politics-private-myfellow-generals-and-admirals/130404/ [https://perma.cc/X779-TC77] (“From my personal
experience across several administrations, the commander-in-chief will value our military advice
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no mystery why candidates consistently seek to leverage support from
this demographic. The U.S. military enjoys the highest public approval
rating among government institutions,8 and politicians understand
that statements from senior officers can significantly affect public
opinion in other contexts, like approval for a proposed use
of force abroad.9
But campaign outlets and the press inevitably refer to retired
flag officers by their former rank and publish old photos of them in
uniform, a practice the officers themselves do little to discourage.10 This
leads to a conflation of their past and present status. As many
commentators have noted, any influence wielded by these individuals

only if they believe that it is given without political bias or personal agenda.”); Feaver, supra note
5 (“When Allen demonstrates that he thinks it is acceptable to dismiss criticism ab initio from
civilians who have not served in combat . . . [h]e is also complicating the jobs of those who have a
professional obligation to prepare for . . . a Trump presidency . . . .”); Feaver, supra note 4 (arguing
that retired flag officers have a responsibility not to engage in partisan endorsements); Matthew
Moten, We Have a Big Problem with Retired Generals Wading into Partisanship, FOREIGN POL’Y:
BEST DEF. (Sept. 12, 2016, 11:06 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/12/we-have-a-bigproblem-with-retired-generals-wading-into-partisanship/ [https://perma.cc/GE9Z-88H9] (tracing
the history of the modern endorsement practice and suggesting that it is not only problematic on
its own, but also makes candidates more comfortable speaking about the military in
inappropriately partisan terms). But see General Michael Flynn Sounds Off on Generals Allen and
Dempsey, Khizr Khan, FOX NEWS RADIO (Aug. 1, 2016), https://radio.foxnews.com/2016/08/01/
general-michael-flynn-sounds-off-on-generals-allen-and-dempsey-khizr-khan/ [https://perma.cc/
G2V3-4KX3] [hereinafter Flynn Radio Interview] (providing transcript of Flynn’s response to
criticism to his partisan activity); Michael E. O’Hanlon, In Defense of John Allen, BROOKINGS (Aug.
1, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/08/01/in-defense-of-john-allen/
[https://perma.cc/4UDT-CDU7] (arguing that retired flag officers should be able to engage in the
“national political debate”).
8.
See Lydia Saad, Military, Small Business, Police Still Stir Most Confidence, GALLUP
(June
28,
2018),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/236243/military-small-business-police-stirconfidence.aspx [https://perma.cc/9KYF-A8FB] (reporting that seventy-four percent of
respondents have a “[g]reat deal” of confidence in the military, compared to fifty-four percent in
the police, thirty-seven percent in the Supreme Court, twenty-nine percent in public schools,
twenty-two percent in the criminal justice system, and eleven percent in Congress).
9.
See JIM GOLBY, KYLE DROPP & PETER FEAVER, LISTENING TO THE GENERALS: HOW
MILITARY ADVICE AFFECTS PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE USE OF FORCE 5 (Ctr. for a New Am. Sec. ed.,
2013),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Generals-report-updated.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4LH5-HP98] (finding that statements by senior military leaders opposing a
proposed use of force abroad caused a seven percent decline in overall public support for the action,
while approving statements caused a three percent increase in public support).
10. E.g. Eric Schmitt, Clinton and Trump Each Lay Claim to Military Brass, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/08/us/politics/clinton-and-trump-each-layclaim-to-military-brass.html [https://perma.cc/QV3Y-Z4WR]; Hillary for America (@HFA),
TWITTER (Sept. 7, 2016, 4:33 PM), https://twitter.com/HFA/status/773665567744126976
[https://perma.cc/N9C7-89J6]; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 22, 2016,
8:49 PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/756697615509688320 [https://perma.cc/
6BMD-Z8CJ]. The individuals themselves certainly contribute. For example, Flynn’s twitter
handle is “@GenFlynn.” General Flynn (@GenFlynn), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/GenFlynn (last
visited Mar. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/T5NV-DCEB].
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hinges on the credibility of their former institution,11 a credibility
derived in part from a tradition of nonpartisan service to civilian
leaders.12 Not only do retired military officer endorsements fail to affect
how most Americans vote,13 they also appear to erode public trust
in military leaders.14
This Note explores the issue of flag officer endorsements in
presidential elections and recommends that if lesser interventions fail
to curb the practice, Congress should condition an officer’s promotion to
flag officer rank upon a promise that she will wait eight years after
retirement to make an endorsement. Part I summarizes why the United
11. See Dempsey, supra note 7 (“Their opinion is valued chiefly because it is assumed they
speak with authority for those who have served in uniform.”); Martin E. Dempsey, Letter to the
Editor, Military Leaders Do Not Belong at Political Conventions, WASH. POST (July 30, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/military-leaders-do-not-belong-at-politicalconventions/2016/07/30/0e06fc16-568b-11e6-b652-315ae5d4d4dd_story.html
[https://perma.cc/
XV6P-4T2W] (“[Generals Allen and Flynn] weren’t introduced . . . as ‘John’ and ‘Mike.’ They were
introduced as generals. As generals, they have an obligation to uphold our apolitical traditions.
They have just made the task of their successors . . . more complicated.”); Feaver, supra note 4
(“[T]hey appear to be speaking for the military. They are cloaking themselves in the
extraordinarily high degree of respect that the American public accords to the uniformed
military.”).
12. See Bryan Bender, Twitter and Facebook are Politicizing the Military, POLITICO (Feb. 26,
2017, 7:10 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/pentagon-survey-twitter-facebookmilitary-politicization-235378 [https://perma.cc/X2U4-UXBS] (quoting researcher who links public
trust in the military to a perception that it is “above the political fray”); Feaver, supra note 4
(arguing that “a crucial pillar” of public respect for the military is the belief that it “self-consciously
and purposefully stands outside of partisan politics”); id. (linking a perception of nonpartisanship
to higher levels of public esteem and arguing that the “act of wading into partisan politics while
also pretending to be above partisan politics . . . risks undermining public confidence in [the
military]”).
13. A 2013 YouGov survey asked, “Suppose you were voting in an election and one of the
candidates has been endorsed by a retired military officer. Would this make you more or less likely
to vote for the candidate endorsed by the retired military officer?” WARRIORS & CITIZENS:
AMERICAN VIEWS OF OUR MILITARY CROSSTABS 1, at 40 (Kori N. Schake & Jim Mattis eds., 2016),
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/pages/docs/civ-mil_1_tabs.pdf [https://perma.cc/M64YDZ2T] [hereinafter WARRIORS & CITIZENS]. Sixty-four percent of nearly one thousand respondents
said it would have “no effect,” and ten percent answered “don’t know.” Id. Only twenty-seven
percent answered that it would affect their vote in some direction. Id.; see also JAMES GOLBY, KYLE
DROPP & PETER FEAVER, MILITARY CAMPAIGNS: VETERANS’ ENDORSEMENTS AND PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS 10 (Ctr. for a New Am. Sec. ed., 2012), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/
documents/CNAS_MilitaryCampaigns_GolbyDroppFeaver.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8FVN-KV99]
(discussing surveys and concluding, “[A]t the most aggregate level . . . political endorsements from
military members and veterans do not persuade voters”).
14. See Peter Feaver, Do Retired Military Endorsements Boost Support for Candidates—or
Just Reduce Support for the Military?, FOREIGN POL’Y: SHADOW GOV’T (Sept. 8, 2016, 5:24 PM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/08/do-retired-military-endorsements-boost-support-forcandidates-or-just-reduce-support-for-the-military/ [https://perma.cc/89EL-BPUF] (summarizing
Morning Consult poll from August 2016 that indicated the Flynn and Allen endorsements had no
clear effect on voting choices but did lead respondents to express decreased confidence in military
leaders); cf. GOLBY, DROPP & FEAVER, supra note 13, at 17–18 (finding that military endorsements
had no significant effect on reported levels of public trust in the military, but did make respondents
more likely to associate violence, homophobia, or racism with the military).
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States needs a nonpartisan military establishment. It explains that
retired flag officer endorsements threaten the constitutional tenet of
civilian control over the military and weaken military effectiveness. It
concludes by addressing common defenses of the practice.
Part II explains the unique legal status of military retirees and
outlines the existing array of statutory and regulatory restrictions on
their political activities through a historical lens. Part III explains why
these restrictions fail to address the flag officer endorsement problem.
It also describes why shoring up professional norms through the
exertion of peer and public pressure—the most common purported
solution to this issue—will continue to fail. Part IV draws analogies to
other contexts in which restrictions on endorsements have been seen as
necessary to protect related compelling state interests. It examines
anti-endorsement provisions as applied to judges and civil servants and
studies the postemployment ethics rules for military retirees in the
business context.
Finally, Part V outlines several potential legal responses,
evaluating their ability to reduce the number or impact of flag officer
endorsements, curb parties’ desire to seek them out, and reinforce
professional norms. For each proposal, it provides a preliminary
analysis of First Amendment implications. Ultimately, it recommends
a combination of modest proposals that could help protect the public’s
current level of trust in the military and foster a healthier relationship
between elected officials and top military leaders. It also provides a
sketch of a bolder option that Congress could consider employing in the
event
that
the
modest
proposals
fail
to
adequately
contain the problem.
Before proceeding, a few quick words about scope. Retired flag
officer endorsements represent only one symptom of a larger
politicization15 problem within the military—one that some scholars
15. Scholars use the word “politicization” to describe multiple related but distinct concepts in
reference to the military: (1) an increasing likelihood that members will advocate for political
positions (of any stripe) or feel entitled to make decisions more appropriately made by political
leaders, (2) an increasing likelihood that members will sympathize with one particular political
party or ideology, (3) an increasing likelihood that civilian leaders will employ the military in ways
that encourage or take advantage of the first two trends, and (4) an increasing likelihood that
civilian leaders will employ the military in ways the scholar believes are not correct uses for the
military. In this Note, I explore (1). While outside the scope of this Note, some have suggested that
(3) and (4) are also problems. See Kori Schake & Jim Mattis, A Great Divergence?, in WARRIORS &
CITIZENS, supra note 13, (“[P]ressures could . . . cause cynicism about civilians for hiding behind
the military to avoid taking responsibility for their political choices”); W. Kent Davis, Swords into
Plowshares: The Dangerous Politicization of the Military in the Post-Cold War Era, 33 VAL. U. L.
REV. 61, 68–77 (1998) (describing and criticizing expanded domestic uses of the military). Many
have also referenced (2) in observing that the officer corps skews conservative, while enlisted
soldiers have more representative political views. E.g. GOLBY, DROPP & FEAVER, supra note 9, at
9 n.25. See generally JASON K. DEMPSEY, OUR ARMY: SOLDIERS, POLITICS, AND AMERICAN CIVIL-

7_Miller_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2020]

5/22/2020 7:18 PM

RETIRED MILITARY OFFICER ENDORSEMENTS

1215

believe is worsening.16 Certainly servicemembers of all ranks and those
remaining on active duty are part of this problem. For example, lowerranking personnel are the most likely to publicize their political views
on social media.17 But it makes sense to begin this inquiry by examining
the behavior of senior officers, because civilians are more likely to
perceive them as spokespeople for the military as an interest group.18
And it makes sense to begin with retirees instead of active duty
personnel, because existing restraints on the active force are both more
robust and more likely to be enforced, while retiree speech exists in a
less black-and-white legal landscape.19
While much of the analysis in this Note might apply with equal
force to endorsements in congressional or state races, it is limited at
present to addressing the problem in U.S. presidential elections. The
overwhelming bulk of flag officer endorsements fall into this category.
Moreover, presidential elections heighten many of the dangerous
consequences of partisan endorsements described in Part I because they
engage a national audience and involve the greatest participation by
the public.20 Therefore, flag officer endorsements pose the most
significant threat in this arena.

MILITARY RELATIONS 70–82 (2009) (describing studies that identify the political affiliation of the
officer corps and enlisted soldiers). However, recent data suggests officers are increasingly less
likely to identify as Republican. HEIDI A. URBEN, LIKE, COMMENT, RETWEET: THE STATE OF THE
MILITARY’S NONPARTISAN ETHIC IN THE WORLD OF SOCIAL MEDIA 15 tbl.2 (2017),
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/casestudies/cco_casestudy-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2VF3-ZM75].
16. E.g., Jason Dempsey & Amy Schafer, Is There Trouble Brewing for Civil-Military
Relations in the U.S.?, WORLD POL. REV. (May 23, 2017), https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/
articles/22222/is-there-trouble-brewing-for-civil-military-relations-in-the-u-s
[https://perma.cc/
HC2G-BQBN]; see also Alice Hunt Friend, Military Politicization, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L
STUD. (May 5, 2017), https://www.csis.org/analysis/military-politicization [https://perma.cc/
Q9NM-XYYA] (explaining existing methods of measuring politicization, describing the limitations
of these methods, and concluding at the very least that “professional standards for ‘citizen-soldiers’
have shifted over time from general abstention from any political affiliation to a broad comfort
with registering with—and consistently voting for—political parties”).
17. URBEN, supra note 15, at 24; see also Bender, supra note 12 (summarizing Urben’s data).
18. Cf. Dempsey & Schafer, supra note 16 (“[G]eneral [public] ignorance of the diversity of
political viewpoints among service members has enabled some politicians and retired officers to
opportunistically capitalize on the armed forces’ [conservative] reputation to advance personal
political views and ambitions.”).
19. See infra Part II.
20. Cf. Voter Turnout, MIT ELECTION DATA + SCI. LAB fig.1, https://electionlab.mit.edu/
research/voter-turnout (last visited Mar. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/AUW6-3XTF] (reporting
significantly higher turnout rates for “on-year” elections—that is, those including a U.S.
presidential race—as compared to “off-year” elections, from 1980 to 2016).
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I. THE DANGER OF “GENERAL” ELECTIONS
The Supreme Court has called “a politically neutral military
establishment under civilian control” an “American constitutional
tradition.”21 Scholars offer different normative theories about the exact
behaviors that “civilian control” should curtail and disagree about
exactly how to describe the constitutional allocation of powers over the
military in furtherance of this goal.22 Rather than engage in these lively
debates, this Part will sketch out broad areas of agreement regarding
the importance and utility of a nonpartisan military establishment and
explain why political endorsements from retired flag officers endanger
civilian control while also reducing military effectiveness.
A. The Importance of a Nonpartisan Military Establishment
The Founders sought to prevent the risk of a military coup,
presidential abuse of military might, and military adventurism.23 They
preferred part-time citizen militias over standing armies,24 and while
they reluctantly authorized the creation of a standing national force,
they subordinated it to the command of a civilian executive and then
divided up the other powers necessary to exercise military power
between the executive and Congress.25 Since 1789, U.S. military officers

21. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976); see also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)
(“The concerns . . . reflect a traditional and strong resistance of Americans to any military
intrusion into civilian affairs. That tradition has deep roots in our history and found early
expression, for example, in the . . . constitutional provisions for civilian control of the military.”).
22. See, e.g., David Luban, On the Commander in Chief Power, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 477 (2008)
(describing separationist and consolidationist theories of civilian control and advocating for a
“third way”); John Yoo, Administration of War, 58 DUKE L.J. 2277 (2009) (advancing a conception
of civilian control that emphasizes consolidation of power under the executive).
23. See Luban, supra note 22, at 531 (“[T]he framers and ratifiers feared a Caesar or a
Cromwell, wished to limit the president’s power to abuse the standing army, despised military
adventurism, and feared that a president with formidable war powers might indulge in it.”).
24. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 167 (rev. ed. 1981); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton)
(describing standing armies and the “correspondent appendages of military establishments” as
“institutions which have a tendency to destroy [nations’] civil and political rights”).
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11–16 (enumerating the powers of Congress to declare war,
raise and support armies, provide for and maintain a navy, “make Rules for the Government and
Regulation” of these forces, and control state militias when “employed in the Service of the United
States”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1–2 (stating that “[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States” and giving the president power to appoint “Officers of
the United States” with the Senate’s advice and consent); see Geoffrey Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen,
The Political Balance of Power over the Military: Rethinking the Relationship Between the Armed
Forces, the President, and Congress, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 553, 561–62 (2007) (describing the
constitutional division of authority over the military). For an account of the Framers’ efforts to
divide the military powers among the federal and state governments, and an argument for why
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have taken an oath to support and defend the Constitution—not just the
commander in chief or Congress.26 The primary concern in the nation’s
early years was the improper concentration of military power in the
hands of too few civilians, not the wayward independence of a fledgling
military establishment.27
But as conflict became more complex, the management of
violence required specialists, and the military professionalized.28 A
much larger, more permanent military establishment needed to be able
to serve the interests of the state throughout periods of political
transition. Full-time military professionals inevitably developed
institutional values and biases as a result of their function within the
state.29 A different primary risk emerged—that military leaders would
inappropriately pursue policy preferences inconsistent with the wishes
of civilians in the executive branch or Congress.30
Professor Samuel Huntington famously argued that the
constitutional separation of powers does not adequately constrain the
modern military establishment and may in fact draw military leaders
into interbranch political conflicts.31 His solution was what he called
objective civilian control, the principle of loyalty to professional norms
and ethics instead of civilian partisan connections.32 He argued that a
robust, apolitical professional ethic maximizes the military’s ability to
serve as an effective tool of the state.33
Modern principal-agent theorists critique and build on
Huntington’s insights. They envision the ideal military as a faithful
agent, merely advising on and carrying out the policy preferences of
civilian principals in the executive or legislative branches but never

the modern military force structure violates these vertical checks, see Robert Leider, Federalism
and the Military Power of the United States, 73 VAND. L. REV. 989 (2020).
26. See Oaths of Enlistment and Oaths of Office, U.S. ARMY CTR. MIL. HIST.,
https://history.army.mil/html/faq/oaths.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/QV9LHPML] (reproducing text of oaths).
27. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 24, at 168 (“The Framers’ concept of civilian control was to
control the uses to which civilians might put military force . . . . Unable to visualize a distinct
military class, they could not fear such a class.”).
28. Id. at 13, 32.
29. See id. at 61–70 (deducing a number of values and preferences that likely result from the
professional role of the military).
30. See, e.g., Richard H. Kohn, The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United
States Today, 55 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 9, 33 (2002) (“[I]n the last generation, the American military
has slipped from conceiving of its primary role as advice to civilians followed by execution of their
orders, to trying—as something proper, even essential in some situations—to impose its viewpoint
on policies or decisions.”).
31. HUNTINGTON, supra note 24, at 177.
32. Id. at 74, 83.
33. Id. at 83.
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substituting their own.34 While this is the ideal, the reality is that some
substitution occurs. This can be conceived of as a “spectrum” of shirking
behaviors;35 as the “relative influence” of military officials over civilian
counterparts;36 as “bargaining” between the electorate, civilians in
government, and the military elite;37 or as a “conflictual collaborative
relationship” marked by a “dialogue of unequals.”38 A related but
distinct concern involves military leaders leveraging “outsized political
popularity” with the public to distort the decisionmaking process.39 But
however articulated, the basic idea is that civilian principals are
democratically accountable to the electorate, unlike military agents,
and therefore they should get the ultimate decisionmaking power.40
While military agents can and must provide expert technical advice, the
principals enjoy the prerogative to choose “incorrectly” from the
perspective of military effectiveness.41
Of course, the line between providing technical advice and
wading into policy can be difficult to identify.42 This tension is especially
visible when Congress demands the “honest and unvarnished opinions
of military leaders” and those opinions happen to diverge from those of

34. See, e.g., PETER D. FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS: AGENCY, OVERSIGHT, AND CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS 56–58 (2003); see also Kohn, supra note 30, at 9, 33; Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Soldier,
the State, and the Separation of Powers, 90 TEX. L. REV. 797, 816–17 (2012) (outlining the
principal-agent model).
35. See Kohn, supra note 34, at 16 (listing various ways that the military can “evade,”
“circumscribe,” and “stymie” civilian authority).
36. Id. at 15.
37. See Mackubin Thomas Owens, Military Officers: Political Without Partisanship,
STRATEGIC STUD. Q., Fall 2015, at 88, 95–96.
38. See ELIOT A. COHEN, SUPREME COMMAND: SOLDIERS, STATESMEN, AND LEADERSHIP IN
WARTIME 10, 12 (2003):
[T]he ultimate domination of the civilian leader is contingent, often fragile, and always
haunted by his own lack of experience at high command . . . . Civil-military relations
must thus be a dialogue of unequals and the degree of civilian intervention in military
matters a question of prudence, not principle, because principle properly opens the
entire field of military activity to civilian scrutiny and direction.
39. Pearlstein, supra note 34, at 841. Sometimes this can occur with the approval or sanction
of the civilian principals. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian
Control of the U.S. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 343–44 (1994).
40. Pearlstein, supra note 34, at 802, 816–17.
41. See Luban, supra note 22, at 484 (noting that “wrench[ing] the commander in chief power
out of the hands of the competent professionals (the generals) and put[ting] it into the hands of
amateurs (the civilians)” could conceivably “impede military effectiveness,” which may be a
“rational trade-off”); Pearlstein, supra note 34, at 802, 816–17 (noting that as part of the principalagent relationship, civilians have the “right to be wrong” (quoting FEAVER, supra note 34, at 57)).
42. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 38, at 264 (arguing that Huntington’s theory of objective
control must be updated to account for “boundaries between political ends and military means”
that are “more uncertain” than he suggested).
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civilian executive officials.43 For example, military leaders have
testified before Congress and contradicted executive branch superiors
regarding, among other things, the appropriate number of troops in
combat zones, the desirability of homosexual servicemembers serving
openly, and the legal protections owed to captured enemy combatants
in the War on Terror.44
As these examples suggest, and as many commentators
acknowledge, top military leaders must be politically savvy to best serve
their dual political principals, and in some cases it may be that the “best
military advice cannot be formed without advocating policy.”45 But
partisanship among military leaders has never been seriously
defended,46 and the next Section will explore its numerous corrosive
consequences. Of course, partisanship represents only one element of
what many believe is a growing crisis in civil-military relations that
cannot be fully explored in this Note. It bears mentioning, however, that
what drives much of the current anxiety is the growing power and
influence of the military’s top flag officers—especially the geographic
combatant commanders and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.47
The time is right to dig a little deeper into the postretirement political
activities of these key leaders.
B. Flag Officer Endorsements Impede Civilian Control
and Military Effectiveness
Whether articulated in Huntingtonian or principal-agent terms,
retired flag officer endorsements threaten civilian control of the
military, which in turn can weaken military effectiveness. If civilian
43. Victor Hansen, Understanding the Role of Military Lawyers in the War on Terror: A
Response to the Perceived Crisis in Civil-Military Relations, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 617, 627 (2009).
44. Yoo, supra note 22, at 2286–90.
45. J.P. Clark, We Want It, What Is It? Unpacking Civilian Control of the Military, STRATEGY
BRIDGE (April 4, 2017), https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/4/4/unpacking-civiliancontrol-of-the-military [https://perma.cc/ZQF8-GYTY]; see, e.g., Owens, supra note 37, at 88, 97
(“[O]fficers must understand both the political environment and the policy process and be able to
participate in debates over policy without becoming swept up in partisan politics.”).
46. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 38, at 264 (“Huntington is correct in his contention that such
partisanship will eventually diminish military proficiency.”).
47. See, e.g., Mark Patrick Nevitt, The Operational and Administrative Militaries, 53 GA. L.
REV. 905, 909, 912–13, 917–18, 925–32 (2019) (explaining the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the geographic combatant commands, and describing how the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986
reallocated a huge amount of power to these individuals and “isolated the operational military
from oversight”); Paul D. Shinkman, The Joint Chiefs’ Power Surge, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Sept. 30, 2019, 11:37 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2019-09-30/howjoe-dunford-quietly-changed-the-joint-chiefs-role-in-preparing-for-war
[https://perma.cc/UP42SG85] (arguing that former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford fought for
and won new responsibilities outside of the office’s role and that civilian DoD staffers “have become
ostracized from the critical work” that leads to decisionmaking).
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principals fear generals becoming political enemies after retirement,
they may be less likely to trust them with the information necessary to
make decisions that require genuine professional expertise.48
Alternatively, they may improperly defer to military leaders on policy
decisions, subordinating the priorities of the electorate to military
institutional biases or the political preferences of unelected officers.
Worst yet, principals could select replacements based not on technical
competence but on perceived political compatibility.49 Continued
endorsements, especially in the face of controversy, could effectively
confirm to junior military leaders that the norms have changed and that
freely broadcasting their own partisan views is acceptable.50
Subordinates who believe their views are disfavored may lose trust in
the chain of command, reducing cohesion and unit readiness.
Increasingly seeing themselves as partisan actors, senior military
advisors may be more likely to engage in the most evasive shirking
behaviors, like leaking to the press in an effort to shape decisions on
force structure or deployments.51
Finally, members of the American public, after years of seeing
retired officers trotted across political stages and years of reading
competing lists of endorsements, may begin to think of the military as
“just one more pressure group acting to advance its views and interests,
not the neutral instrument of the state.”52 This could have a selffulfilling effect, encouraging those within the force to see their
48. See Steve Corbett & Michael J. Davidson, The Role of the Military in Presidential Politics,
PARAMETERS, Winter 2009–2010, at 58, 67–68 (“Civilian political leadership may distrust and fear
its senior military advisers as possible political threats, impeding a free flow of confidential
information and candor.”). One anecdote demonstrates how easily this lack of trust could develop.
Retired Admiral Bill Crowe, who had served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under George
H.W. Bush, ultimately endorsed Bill Clinton. After losing reelection, Bush told Crowe’s successor,
Colin Powell, that he “was disappointed,” saying, “Thought I treated him pretty well. Offered to
let him stay on as chairman for another term.” See Clifford M. Bayne, From Stars to Stumps: How
Retired Flag Officer Political Endorsements Affect Civil-Military Relations 46–47 (June 1, 2016)
(unpublished MPhil thesis, Air University School of Advanced Air and Space Studies) (quoting
COLIN L. POWELL, MY AMERICAN JOURNEY 561 (1995), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/
u2/1030401.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4VG-TGKC]. Had Bush been reelected, it is easy to see how a
feeling that Crowe had been personally disloyal could have influenced his interactions with
Crowe’s successors.
49. E.g., Corbett & Davidson, supra note 48, at 68.
50. Id. at 68–69. Peter Feaver has also pointed out that a “poisonous” effect on the active
force can occur when endorsers defend their expertise by suggesting an opposing candidate with
no military experience has no credibility to challenge them. Feaver, supra note 5. Feaver argues
that this broadcasts to active duty military officers that “it is acceptable to dismiss criticism ab
initio from civilians who have not served in combat,” when the orders of said civilians must be
obeyed regardless. Id.
51. Bayne, supra note 48, at 23; see also Owens, supra note 37, at 92–93 (summarizing some
of the most common shirking behaviors).
52. Richard H. Kohn, General Elections: The Brass Shouldn’t Do Endorsements, WASH. POST,
Sept. 19, 2000, at A23.
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organization in this way; it could also cause a drop in public esteem for
the military and veterans.53 Low public esteem could hinder
recruitment,54 especially recruitment from a diverse ideological crosssection, which would make the military less representative of the entire
nation and could compound ideological imbalances.55 A skeptical public
could ultimately elect civilian principals that are more openly hostile to
the military and less willing to defer to genuine military technical
expertise.56 In sum, retired flag officer endorsements degrade the
apolitical professional ethic, threatening Huntington’s Objective
Civilian Control. They also make the principal-agent relationship
increasingly toxic and unworkable. These effects, undesirable on their
own, may also reduce the military’s effectiveness by instilling
subordinate distrust and tension within the chain of command and
decreasing the odds that the best professional expertise will be followed.
C. Evaluating Common Defenses of Flag Officer Endorsements
Of course, not everyone sees the practice of flag officer
endorsements as a problem. Endorsers and some like-minded
academics offer four general defenses of the practice: (1) it helps educate
the electorate about the national security issues at stake;57 (2) because
endorsers are no longer on active duty, they should be able to express
political views like ordinary civilians;58 (3) veterans have frequently run
for—and won—political office, making mere endorsements relatively
inconsequential;59 and (4) as long as endorsements go to both major

53. See, e.g., Feaver, supra note 4 (arguing that the media and the Supreme Court are held
in low esteem because they are “supposed to stand above partisanship but in fact appear not to,”
and warning that the military could see a similar effect).
54. Bayne, supra note 48, at 26.
55. Some argue this already occurs. See Diane H. Mazur, Why Progressives Lost the War When
They Lost the Draft, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553, 630 (2003):
Young people are choosing to join or to avoid the military on the basis of perceived
ideological compatibility with an institution that has disregarded its constitutional
obligations to be representative of the society from which it draws its members and to
maintain its political neutrality with respect to its civilian principals.
56. Bayne, supra note 48, at 26.
57. See, e.g., O’Hanlon, supra note 7 (arguing that it is better to debate the “vague and murky”
guidelines surrounding the appropriateness of partisan activities than to “deprive our national
political debate of the seasoned and reasoned views of some of its finest and most knowledgeable
citizens”).
58. See, e.g., Feaver, supra note 5 (paraphrasing a critique the author had been sent
regarding the endorser’s First Amendment rights).
59. See, e.g., O’Hanlon, supra note 7 (arguing that in criticizing his fellow retired generals for
endorsing political candidates, Martin Dempsey had “forgotten” Presidents Washington, Grant,
Eisenhower, and other former generals who have run or considered running for president).
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parties, there is little chance of harm.60 None of these defenses
withstand scrutiny.
The first defense can be stated in principal-agent terms. Retired
flag officers who choose to endorse are simply providing the “ultimate
civilian principal”61 (the electorate) with more information about the
chosen candidate’s national security policies and bona fides.62 The logic
of this defense breaks down when confronted with the realities of a
modern presidential election. Campaigns competitively aggregate lists
of endorsements and pit one seemingly qualified general on television
opposite another seemingly equally qualified one. Voters may
understandably conclude that there is no consensus about which
candidate is “better” on national security and military issues. They may
reasonably reject endorsement information as unhelpful, especially if it
is rolled out less to garner support for specific positions and more to
simply deflect attention away from a candidate’s lack of personal
military experience or some other security-related “weakness.”63
Of course, the industrious voter might compare endorsers’
resumes and research any offered justifications, especially those of
endorsers that are more active on the campaign trail. But even
assuming that voters would accord more weight to the implied views of
former flag officers than to civilian “experts,” it is at least an open
question whether they should. Having worn a uniform may mean that
veterans have a personal stake in political decisions involving the
military. But unless a veteran also has experience relative to specific
60. See, e.g., Friend, supra note 16 (“[I]t may seem harmless so long as both major parties
can marshal officer-advocates . . . .”).
61. Pearlstein, supra note 34, at 817 (quoting FEAVER, supra note 34, at 302).
62. One can imagine a variant of this defense that argues some kinds of endorsements are
better than others. Officers endorsing candidates on ideological grounds should be criticized, but
endorsements based on “institutional” reasons like military spending or veterans’ benefits should
be considered benign. Presumably, the idea is that military spending and veterans’ benefits
generally receive bipartisan support, and thus the endorsement appears more “technical” and less
overtly political. This distinction is too simplistic. As recent moves to provide more private-sector
medical care to veterans demonstrates, “better on funding” is a position that incorporates many
implicit political judgments. See Lisa Rein, VA Is Gearing Up for a Massive Shift of Health Care to
the Private Sector. But Democrats Are Fighting Back., WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/va-is-gearing-up-for-a-massive-reroute-of-health-careto-the-private-sector-but-democrats-are-fighting-back/2019/03/21/637f732a-467b-11e9-90f00ccfeec87a61_story.html [https://perma.cc/H4PU-XJ5D] (describing those who believe recent
Trump Administration regulations will lead to destructive privatization of the Veterans Health
Administration). Even assuming an endorsement would be communicated in a nuanced way
instead of simply tallied on a list, voters could easily conflate “better treatment for the troops” with
support for a candidate’s position on where to send those troops. And endorsers would always be
able to frame incredibly divisive political issues, such as restrictions on transgender troops, in
“institutional” terms. That danger is precisely the issue.
63. Cf. Kohn, supra note 52 (“[R]etired Joint Chiefs Chairman William Crowe and a handful
of other retired flag officers endorsed Bill Clinton, defusing his draft dodging as an issue.”).
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geopolitical issues, her personal stake does not necessarily equate to a
more credible opinion than those of civilians who have observed and
studied the same issues from other vantage points.64 Finally, the data
suggest that even if voters gain information from flag officer
endorsements, very few of them change their previous support or
nonsupport for the endorsed candidate.65 If the practice does not even
help guide voting decisions, then it represents all risk and no reward.
The second defense argues that these men and women have
retired, making their actions akin to those of any other civilians wishing
to exercise political speech.66 As others have recognized, however, these
endorsements derive authority (and thus appeal) from their invocation
of institutional experience and expertise.67 No campaign widely
publicizes the approval of a junior soldier that served one contract and
then left the military. No candidate seeks the approval of a retired flag
officer in her capacity as a parent or a homeowner. Rather, candidates
seek a prominent leader that the public can imagine as a proxy for the
military writ large. Even if the endorser is careful about disclaiming
this notion, campaigns certainly embrace it.68
As a matter of law, these retirees also differ significantly from
ordinary civilians. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) still
applies to them, and each branch defines its own membership to include
them.69 The same concerns about neutrality that motivate restrictions
on active duty servicemembers already motivate certain modest
restrictions on the political activities of retirees.70 In sum, while free
64. See Rosa Brooks, Sorry Folks, Veterans Are Not Necessarily Experts on Foreign Policy,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 8, 2016, 11:03 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/08/veterans-are-notnecessarily-experts-on-foreign-policy-commander-in-chief-forum-trump-clinton/ [https://perma.cc/
NZC6-RE2F] (“A supply sergeant in the Army has a personal stake in whether U.S. troops are
deployed to Iraq, but this doesn’t make him an expert on the Middle East. The same is true of
senior officers: Some have valuable strategic insight about geopolitics; others don’t.”).
65. WARRIORS & CITIZENS, supra note 13, Crosstabs 1, at 40.
66. See, e.g., Feaver, supra note 5.
67. Supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
68. GOLBY, DROPP & FEAVER, supra note 13, at 15 (“Retired senior officers may think they
are drawing fine distinctions between the formal institution of active-duty military and their own
views as retired citizens. But the truth is that no one, especially not the campaign team, is very
interested in their views as private citizens.”).
69. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(4) (2012) (applying the UCMJ to “[r]etired members of a regular
component of the armed forces who are entitled to pay”); e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 7075(b)(3) (2012) (“The
Regular Army includes . . . the retired officers and enlisted members of the Regular Army.”); 10
U.S.C. § 9075(b)(3) (2012) (“The Regular Air Force includes . . . the retired officers and enlisted
members of the Regular Air Force.”); see also DEP’T OF THE ARMY, REG. 27–10: MILITARY JUSTICE
¶ 5–2(b)(3) (May 11, 2016), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/
r27_10_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5B2-ZZUD] [hereinafter AR 27–10] (“Retirees are subject to
the UCMJ and may be tried by court-martial for violations . . . that occurred . . . while in a retired
status.”).
70. See infra Part II.
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speech concerns may dictate the scale of the appropriate remedy, they
do not explain away the problem of retired flag officer endorsements.
Where one fundamental constitutional tenet—civilian control—butts
up against another—free speech—constraints on these individuals
should at least be up for debate.
The third defense of the practice asks: Why should we object to
retired flag officers making endorsements if we would not object to them
running for office?71 One response is that voters can more directly
express their approval or disapproval of a candidate’s behavior.72
Another distinction derives from the public perception of a declared
candidate compared to an endorser. Those that run for office explicitly
project an image of themselves as a partisan, with a personal political
stake in the outcome.73 Endorsers, by contrast, project themselves as
vessels of decades of nonpartisan experience. For example, Michael
Flynn defended his involvement with President Trump’s campaign by
saying, “I feel obligated because of my service to this country,”
suggesting some kind of professional duty to “help this country” via his
endorsement.74 Similarly, John Allen justified his support for Hillary
Clinton by saying he “felt compelled to speak up and be heard.”75 Both
retired generals pointed to decades of abstention from politics while in
the active force as a reason for voters to take their endorsements
seriously.76 In other words, endorsers are “standing on the stage
wrapped in the mantle of a non-partisan institution but deploying that
garb for a partisan end.”77
Finally, some might argue that as long as endorsements go to
both major parties, there is little chance of harm because the public will
not associate the military with one particular party. This is
shortsighted. Members of the public already believe that

71. See, e.g., O’Hanlon, supra note 7. Huntington addressed a form of this argument while
laying out his theory of objective civilian control. He analyzed the success of military candidates
from Washington to Eisenhower and concluded, counterintuitively, that it was “conclusive proof
that political power and military professionalism are incompatible in the American climate.”
HUNTINGTON, supra note 24, at 158. He argued that the “military man qua military man” has
never been a successful candidate. Id. Rather, Americans favored nonprofessionals in the era of
amateur citizen-soldiers, “military iconoclast[s],” or else career soldiers able to convey reluctance
for politics but commitment to serving the entire nation. Id. at 157–62.
72. Dempsey, supra note 7; Feaver, supra note 5.
73. See Dempsey, supra note 7.
74. Flynn Radio Interview, supra note 7.
75. Jeff Schogol, Marine Gen. John Allen Has Endorsed Hillary Clinton for President. Here’s
Why that Matters, MARINE CORPS TIMES (July 25, 2016), https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/
2016/07/25/marine-gen-john-allen-has-endorsed-hillary-clinton-for-president-here-s-why-thatmatters/ [https://perma.cc/JG3K-RWCX].
76. Flynn Radio Interview, supra note 7; Schogol, supra note 75.
77. Feaver, supra note 5.
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servicemembers tend to vote Republican,78 even though actual political
preferences within the force have diversified considerably in recent
years.79 Many factors likely feed this perception, including the fact that
with the exception of President Trump, recent Republican candidates
tended to collect more endorsements from former flag officers.80 But
even if both major parties could consistently raise equal numbers of
endorsements, and even if the public would perceive a bipartisan
equilibrium, this does not erase the politicization problem. Most of the
consequences described above would still apply—relationships with
civilian principals could suffer from lack of trust, civilians could select
advisors based on political compatibility, subordinates with differing
views could become disenchanted, and so on.81 Endorsements may
cause harm simply by making active servicemembers more comfortable
advocating for partisan positions of any stripe.
In fact, one could argue that any spread across the political
spectrum magnifies a core problem of retired flag officer endorsements.
If so many military professionals land on opposite sides, it amplifies the
perception that there is less of a professional “right answer” to military
issues. When questions emerge that have less to do with policy
judgments and more to do with the realities of managing conflict,
civilian principals may not accord professional advice sufficient
weight.82 In other words, if civilians no longer think of military leaders
as nonpartisan experts, will they reject actual expertise when it is most
relevant, vital, and urgent?
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT
OF RETIREE POLITICAL ACTIVITY
The preceding Part argued that retired flag officer endorsements
degrade civilian control over the military and make the military less
effective at accomplishing its mission. This Part explains the unique
legal status of retirees within the military justice system. It then
reviews the existing array of statutory and regulatory restrictions on
the political activities of active and retired servicemembers, placing
them in historical context. This discussion demonstrates that the
United States has a long history of utilizing legal tools to promote
78. WARRIORS & CITIZENS, supra note 13, Crosstabs 1, at 42.
79. URBEN, supra note 15, at 15 tbl.2, 16 tbl.4.
80. See Press Release, Hillary for America, supra note 3 (revealing that Mitt Romney received
hundreds more endorsements than Donald Trump, and, indeed, hundreds more than Hillary
Clinton).
81. See Friend, supra note 16; supra Section II.B.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 34–41, 45.
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civilian control over the military and reveals that conceiving of retirees
as part of the equation is far from novel. Civilian control is a
fundamental principle derived from the Constitution, but it relies on
legal measures beyond the Constitution to manifest and protect it.83
A. How and Why Retired Servicemembers Are
Subject to Military Jurisdiction
This Section provides some background on the military justice
system more generally and then explains military jurisdiction over
retirees. The Constitution empowers Congress to “make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”84 This
means that Congress can authorize a system that remains largely
independent from Article III courts in order to hold servicemembers
accountable for impermissible conduct.85 It has done so. Structured
around the authority of (nonlawyer) commanders, the current statutory
scheme evolved from British customary military law86 and is codified in
Title X of the U.S. Code as the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(“UCMJ”).87 In part, the UCMJ includes substantive offenses known as
“punitive articles,” which can be military-specific (think desertion or
disrespecting a superior officer) or look much like typical civilian
criminal provisions (think theft, drug possession, and murder).88 The
UCMJ is also a procedural vehicle, authorizing and describing how to

83. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Officers and the Civil Office Ban, 93 IND. L.J. 241, 243
(2018) (“Although we take the principle of civilian control of the military (and military noncontrol
of civilians) for granted, it turns out that . . . many of its most significant manifestations are
statutory, not constitutional.” (emphasis omitted)).
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. This allows Congress significant leeway in restricting the
individual liberties of servicemembers, to include subjecting them to trial by courts-martial, which
need not provide all of the safeguards afforded to civilian defendants. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,
19 (1957); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879)); see also U.S. CONST. amend V (qualifying the right
to a grand jury for capital “or otherwise infamous crime[s]” with the words “except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger”).
85. See Dan Maurer, Are Military Courts Really Just Like Civilian Criminal Courts?,
LAWFARE (July 13, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/are-military-courts-really-justcivilian-criminal-courts [https://perma.cc/67RF-C9SG] (explaining the unique nature of the
military justice system, highlighting why it was historically “cleanly segregated . . . from its
civilian cousin,” and questioning the Supreme Court’s recent assertion of appellate jurisdiction
over it). But see Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2168–69 (2018) (holding that the Supreme
Court has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the highest appeals court in the military
system, the Court of Appeals of the Armed Forces).
86. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744–47 (1974) (sketching out the historical roots of the
military justice system).
87. Id. at 751.
88. 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934 (2012).
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enforce (1) the punitive articles, (2) military orders,89 (3) applicable
punitive regulations,90 and even (4) other noncapital offenses defined by
federal statute.91
Levels of process within the military justice system—and the
kinds of sanctions available at those levels—vary widely. This is in part
because the “relationship of the Government to members of the
military . . . is not only that of lawgiver to citizen, but also that of
employer to employee.”92 On one end of the spectrum, commanders may
take no action, or they may use “administrative corrective measures”
like counseling sessions, written reprimands, and transfers.93 In the
middle of the spectrum, commanders may direct “nonjudicial
punishment,” which provides limited due process but only exposes the
servicemember to minor penalties like pay reductions and extra duty.94
On the spectrum’s other end, commanders may refer servicemembers
to a court-martial, a trial-like proceeding with the most
serious potential consequences.95
Congress has decided to include military retirees within this
separate legal ecosystem. It has done so by defining the composition of
each service to include “retired officers and enlisted members”96 and by
specifying that the UCMJ applies to “[r]etired members of a regular
component of the armed forces who are entitled to pay.”97 Practically,
this means that regulations and policies that do not distinguish
between “retired” and “active” members apply to retired members as
well, and violators may face enforcement through a UCMJ process.
Federal statutes that do not distinguish as to status would also apply
to retired members, and could be enforced through a civilian proceeding
or via the UCMJ.
89. Violations of regulations may be charged as a violation of the punitive article “failure to
obey order or regulation.” 10 U.S.C. § 892.
90. 10 U.S.C. § 892.
91. See 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2012); see also United States v. Perkins, 47 C.M.R. 259, 263
(A.F.C.M.R. 1973) (“As a general rule, crimes and offenses not capital, as defined by Federal
statutes, may be properly tried as offenses under clause (3) of [Punitive] Article 134.”). When
violations of federal statutes are at issue, the military will often share jurisdiction with other state
and federal entities.
92. Parker, 417 U.S. at 751.
93. Maurer, supra note 85; see also Parker, 417 U.S. at 750 (“Forfeiture of pay, reduction in
rank, and even dismissal from the service bring to mind the law of labor-management relations as
much as the civilian criminal law.”).
94. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (2012); Maurer, supra note 85.
95. 10 U.S.C. §§ 815-876 (2012). These potential consequences include extended
incarceration, large rank reductions, dishonorable discharges, and even capital punishment. 10
U.S.C. § 856. Servicemembers facing nonjudicial punishment may also elect to face a court-martial
instead. 10 U.S.C. § 815(a).
96. E.g., 10 U.S.C. § 7075(b)(3) (2012); 10 U.S.C. § 9075(b)(3) (2012).
97. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(4) (2012).
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Since the first military pension system in 1878, military and
Article III courts have affirmed the exercise of military jurisdiction over
retirees,98 while rejecting military jurisdiction over ex-servicemembers
generally.99 In 2019, the Supreme Court declined to hear a
constitutional challenge to the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction
over a retiree.100
A combination of two theories justifies continued exercise of
jurisdiction over retired personnel: (1) retirees continue to receive
government compensation, and (2) retirees may be ordered back to
active duty at any time.101 The first justification can be traced to 1881,
when the Supreme Court found a retiree eligible for a statutory pay
increase, commenting, ostensibly in support of this proposition, that he
remained subject to court-martial authority.102 Subsequent courts thus
found a jurisdictional hook via the pension.103 But more recently, in
Barker v. Kansas, the Court held that retirement benefits should be
considered “deferred pay for past services,” not “current compensation
for reduced current services,” at least for the purposes of state tax

98. See J. Mackey Ives & Michael J. Davidson, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Retirees
Under Articles 2(4) and 2(6): Time to Lighten Up and Tighten Up?, 175 MIL. L. REV. 1, 3–4, 3 n.6,
4 nn.7–10 (2003) (tracing the inception and confirmation of the idea that “the military” includes
pensioned military officers, citing, for example, the Supreme Court’s judgment that “[t]he retired
officer remains a member of the Army” in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 221 (1981)).
99. U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (rejecting the extension of military
jurisdiction over ex-servicemembers as a whole). Ex-servicemembers comprise a much larger group
than the subsection of those who have attained a retired status, typically after serving twenty or
more years on active duty. In 2018, there were 2,001,343 military retirees receiving retired pay;
only 543,121 of those were retired officers. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE
MILITARY
RETIREMENT
SYSTEM
17
(2019),
https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/14/
2002131753/-1/-1/0/MRS_STATRPT_2018%20V5.PDF [https://perma.cc/A5PJ-DF3S]. The total
U.S. veteran population that year was over 19 million. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Employment Situation of Veterans — 2018, 2 (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/
pdf/vet.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS4L-X7QF].
100. Larrabee v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1164 (2019) (mem.) (denial of cert.). The Supreme
Court has emphasized that the “Constitution . . . condition[s] the proper exercise of court-martial
jurisdiction over an offense on one factor: the military status of the accused,” as defined by
Congress. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 439–40, 450–51 (1987). Congress has defined the
service components to include those in retired status. Supra note 96 and accompanying text.
101. 10 U.S.C. § 688 (2012). This Note limits its analysis to flag officers retired from active
duty and acknowledges that the justification for jurisdiction may be significantly weaker with
regard to those who retired after serving their career in a reserve status. See Leider, supra note
25, at 1071–74 (questioning Congress’s authority to assert criminal jurisdiction over reservists).
102. See United States v. Tyler, 105 U.S. 244, 244–46 (1881) (holding that a retired
servicemember should benefit from a statutory increase in pay because he remained subject “to
the . . . articles of war” (a precursor to the UCMJ) and “a military court-martial[ ] for any breach
of those rules,” and that “the connection is continued, with a retirement from active service only”).
103. See United States v. Dinger, 76 M.J. 552, 555 & n.12 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2017) (“Later
courts have cited Tyler for the proposition that receipt of retirement pay is one reason Congress
may constitutionally authorize courts-martial of those in a retired status.”).
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law.104 The Court has also rejected court-martial jurisdiction over the
family members of servicemembers stationed abroad, despite the fact
that these “dependents” receive government benefits.105 Conversely, the
services have court-martialed members of the Individual Ready
Reserve in a “nonduty, nonpay status.”106 Therefore, receipt of payment
“is neither wholly necessary, nor solely sufficient” to explain the
extension of military jurisdiction to retirees.107
The nation’s potential need to tap already trained personnel for
additional service provides a more satisfying explanation than the
government benefits explanation standing alone. Like members of the
Individual Ready Reserve, military retirees may be ordered to active
duty at any time,108 and in recent decades, some have been called up in
this way.109 As the U.S. Court of Claims has put it, the pension ensures
a “direct connection” to the military, but the money continues to flow
“not solely [as a] recompense for past services, but a means devised by
Congress to assure [retirees’] availability and preparedness
in future contingencies.”110
In Part III, the practical difficulties of enforcement will emerge.
But for now, suffice it to say that retirees hold a unique legal status
among former government employees. Because they receive a pension
and could be obligated to return to active service, military retirees
remain subject to the personal jurisdiction of the military legal system.
A portion of military law governs their behavior until they die.

104. 503 U.S. 594, 595 (1992). The Court made clear, however, that “[m]ilitary retirees
unquestionably remain in the service and are subject to restrictions and recall.” Id. at 599.
105. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1957).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Nettles, 74 M.J. 289, 290, 292–93 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (involving an
appellant ordered to active duty from the Individual Ready Reserve—one of the most dormant
reserve components that does not require drilling or entail pay—so that he could be courtmartialed).
107. Dinger, 76 M.J. at 555–56.
108. 10 U.S.C. § 688 (2012); see also 10 U.S.C. § 8102 (2012) (providing that “except in time of
war or national emergency, not more than ten retired flag officers of the Regular Navy may be on
active duty”).
109. See Rebecca Leung, 60 Minutes: Old Soldiers Back on Duty, CBS NEWS (Dec. 3, 2004),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/old-soldiers-back-on-duty-03-12-2004/
[https://perma.cc/2JZKDBVV] (interviewing people that had been called to active duty from the Individual Ready Reserve
and retirement); see also Devon L. Suits, Army Seeks Retired Medical Soldiers to Support COVID19 Efforts, U.S. ARMY (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.army.mil/article/234059/army_seeks_retired_
medical_soldiers_to_support_covid_19_efforts [https://perma.cc/A28R-V6LM] (describing a call for
retired personnel to volunteer to return to active duty in response to the COVID-19 pandemic).
110. Hooper v. United States, 326 F.2d 982, 987 (Ct. Cl. 1964); see Dinger, 76 M.J. at 554–57
(reviewing Supreme Court precedent bearing on the exercise of court-martial authority over
retirees and concluding, “[W]e are firmly convinced that those in a retired status remain ‘members’
of the land and Naval forces who may face court-martial”).
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B. The Evolution of Restrictions on the
Political Activities of Servicemembers
The oldest still-existing restrictions on the political activities of
servicemembers can be found in a series of Civil War–era federal
criminal statutes outlawing obviously coercive uses of command
authority to skew election results.111 They prohibit (1) the posting of
troops at polling places,112 (2) the marching of servicemembers to polling
places,113 (3) the use of “military authority” to “influence the vote” of
servicemembers,114 and (4) officer interference with local election
officials.115 These provisions likely grew out of a concern that officers
had coerced union soldiers to vote for either Abraham Lincoln or George
McClellan during the presidential election of 1864.116 If soldiers have
ever been prosecuted on the basis of these statutes, trial records are not
readily available; the statutes appear to be rarely, if ever, enforced
today.117
Another political restriction dates to 1870 and came about as
part of Congress’s efforts to downsize the army during
Reconstruction.118 Congress prohibited army officers from holding “any
111. The modern versions of these provisions can be traced to a 1909 statute. See sections 22,
23, 24, 25, and 26 of 35 Stat. 1093 (1909), http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=
35&page=1092 [https://perma.cc/A495-UXR5]. These reconsolidated penal provisions were based
on provisions originally enacted on February 25, 1865 and collected in the 1875 Revised Statutes
as sections 5528, 5529, 5530, 5531, and 5532. See 1 Rev. Stat. 1077–78 (1875); see also 52 THE
CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE: THE OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS 1129 (F. & J. Rives,
Washington, D.C. 1865) (recording that the president had signed a bill “to prevent officers of the
Army and Navy . . . from interfering in elections in the States”).
112. 18 U.S.C. § 592 (2012).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 609 (2012).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 609.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 593 (2012).
116. See Jonathan W. White, How Lincoln Won the Soldier Vote, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR
(Nov. 7, 2014, 8:50 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/07/how-lincoln-won-thesoldier-vote/ [https://perma.cc/2U4T-9XHJ] (describing the widespread manipulation of soldiers’
votes during the 1864 election); see also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 841–42 (1976) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (“[S]ome officers of the Armed Forces, then in combat, sought to exercise undue
influence either for President Lincoln or for his opponent, General McClellan, in the election of
1864.”)
117. See Jeremy S. Weber, Political Speech, the Military, and the Age of Viral Communication,
69 A.F. L. REV. 91, 110 n.108 (2013) (while unaware of the provisions’ provenance prior to 1986,
noting that “the [anti-interference] statute has rarely—if ever—been used to form the basis of a
prosecution” and describing cases where it had been “cited tangentially”). It seems most likely that
if servicemembers were prosecuted based on these provisions, it would have been during the Civil
War.
118. See Memorandum from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to William P. Tyson, Dir., Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys 9 (May 17, 1983) [hereinafter
Olsen OLC Memo]. Professor Stephen Vladeck obtained this memo through a FOIA request and
made it available at https://perma.cc/YLM8-KTR6. See Stephen Vladeck, Military Officers and the
Civil Office Ban, 93 IND. L.J. 241, 245 n.13 (2018).
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civil office, whether by election or appointment.”119 The Chairman of the
House Committee on Military Affairs cited the risk that officers would
increasingly be detailed to civil positions when civilians could not be
found, leading to the “military grow[ing] to be paramount to the civil,
instead of the civil being paramount to the military.”120 Senators
ultimately prevailed in limiting the ban to active duty officers.121 But as
originally passed by the House, the statute would have applied to
pensioned retirees as well, since they “were still so much ‘connected
with’ the military.”122 Typical language from legislators expressed the
belief that “the military should be separate from and subordinate to the
civil authority.”123 Debates appeared to assume that the legislation
would absolutely bar officers from holding any position in the civil
government—elected or appointed, federal or state—unless another
statute expressly allowed the practice.124 The ban on civil office
continued in various forms over the next century and a half. The current
incarnation prevents active officers from holding partisan elective
offices, nominative positions that require Senate advice and consent,
and many other executive positions.125
A curious, but apparently never-enforced statute dating from
World War II forbids anyone, whether in the military or not, from
polling servicemembers about how they voted or how they intend to
vote.126 Because it only prohibits polling that “requires or implies the
necessity of an answer,”127 it likely does not apply to standard
volunteer-based surveys, and these days, there is no shortage of data
on how servicemembers plan to vote in the lead up to presidential
elections.128 One can imagine several purposes for such an antipolling
provision, especially considering its passage coincided with legislation

119. Act of July 15, 1870, ch. 294, § 18, 16 Stat. 315, 319.
120. Olson OLC Memo, supra note 118, at 10 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 150
(1970) (statement of Chairman Logan)).
121. See 16 Stat. 319.
122. Olson OLC Memo, supra note 118, at 10 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1853
(1970) (statement of Rep. Jones)).
123. See id. at 11 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3398 (1970) (statement of Sen.
Thurman)).
124. See id. at 10.
125. 10 U.S.C. § 973 (2012) (implemented by U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 1344.10, POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES BY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES ¶ 4.1.2.3 (Feb. 19, 2008)). The restriction on
holding civilian offices first appeared in the U.S.C. in 1956. See 70A Stat. 203 (1956).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 596 (2012).
127. 18 U.S.C. § 596.
128. E.g., George R. Altman & Leo Shane III, This Poll of the U.S. Military Has Gary Johnson
Tied with Donald Trump in the Race for President, MILITARY TIMES (Sept. 21, 2016),
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/2016/09/21/this-poll-of-the-u-s-military-has-gary-johnsontied-with-donald-trump-in-the-race-for-president/ [https://perma.cc/6CEX-6ZZR].
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encouraging states to change election laws in order to permit absentee
voting by deployed servicemembers.129 Within the ranks, it ensured
that leaders could not force subordinates to reveal political preferences
that could lead to discriminatory treatment and distrust. Perhaps
Congress also wanted to discourage the newly enfranchised
servicemembers from conceiving of themselves as a political bloc and
avoid exposing partisan tendencies within the fighting population to the
larger public.
When the Department of Defense (“DoD”) was created following
World War II, President Truman and Congress vigorously debated how
to ensure civilian control over a more consolidated, more permanent
postwar military establishment.130 Some were concerned about the
extreme popularity of high-ranking veterans and believed that
centralizing military governance that had previously been dispersed
among the separate service secretaries would inappropriately empower
a single person.131 Both the House and Senate bills stipulated that the
secretary of defense must be a civilian appointee, but the House bill
went further in specifying that the secretary could not have previously
served as an active duty officer.132 10 U.S.C. § 113(a) codifies the
compromise they reached: a waiting period of seven years (originally
ten years) before a former officer could assume the position.133
In 1976, the Supreme Court pointed to many of the statutory
restrictions described above as evidence that the United States has
historically created laws in pursuit of a “politically neutral military
establishment under civilian control,” a justification for the Court
upholding a policy that barred candidates from making speeches and
distributing campaign literature at Fort Dix.134
The Civil War anti-interference provisions, the civil office ban,
the prohibition on polling, and the secretary of defense waiting period
suggest that Congress has historically found it necessary to enact legal
constraints on servicemembers when facing novel threats to civilian
control. The waiting period and the legislative history of the civil office
129. Donald S. Inbody, Should Soldiers’ Votes Get Counted? That’s Not as Easy as You Think,
WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2015/11/11/ensuring-soldiers-a-chance-to-vote-was-a-challenge-in-the-civil-war-it-still-istoday/ [https://perma.cc/CVV7-KVBJ].
130. KATHLEEN J. MCINNIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON THE
POSITION OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5–7 (2017).
131. Id. at 6–7.
132. Id. at 8.
133. Id. Congress has made two exceptions: first for George Marshall in 1950, id. at 8–11, and
second for James Mattis in 2017, Exception to Limitation Against Appointment of Persons as
Secretary of Defense, Pub. L. No. 115-2, 131 Stat. 6 (2017).
134. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 & n.12 (1976).
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ban also suggest that restrictions on retirees—even significant
restrictions—have always been a part of this conversation. As Professor
Stephen Vladeck has observed, the survival of the constitutional
principle of civilian control may depend on these kinds of
supplementary legal “manifestations.”135
C. Existing Restrictions on Partisan Endorsements
Currently, the most salient restrictions on the individual
political expression of active and retired personnel come from two
sources: (1) a DoD regulation and (2) a punitive article of the UCMJ.
1. The Regulatory Prohibition on Implied DoD Endorsements
DoD Directive 1344.10, titled “Political Activities by Members of
the Armed Forces,” (“the Political Activity Directive”) prevents active
military personnel from publicly endorsing partisan candidates.136 But
its overarching purpose is much broader: to avoid a perception that the
DoD or any individual service component endorses any particular
candidate or party.137 In the active duty context, this means prohibiting
the most conspicuous forms of political activity while preserving
acceptably private forms of expression. For example, active personnel
may not author, sign, or publish partisan political writings that solicit
votes,138 but they may write letters to the editor concerning political
matters under certain conditions.139 They may not march in political
parades or perform duties for political groups, but they may become a
member of a political group and participate as a “mere spectator” when
not wearing the uniform.140 They may not display a large political sign
on their vehicles or in front of their on-base housing unit, but they may
put a bumper sticker on their car.141 They may not fundraise for
campaigns, but they may contribute themselves.142
135. See Vladeck, supra note 83, at 243, 251 (“[I]nsofar as these statutes themselves are
protecting deeper, transcendent constitutional norms, courts ought to be mindful of those norms
when confronted with questions about these statutes’ meaning and application . . . .”).
136. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 1344.10, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES BY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED
FORCES ¶ 4.1.2.3 (Feb. 19, 2008) [hereinafter DIRECTIVE 1344.10].
137. See id. ¶ 4 (“In keeping with the traditional concept that members on active duty should
not engage in partisan political activity, and that members not on active duty should avoid
inferences that their political activities imply or appear to imply official sponsorship, approval, or
endorsement, the following policy shall apply . . . .”).
138. Id. ¶ 4.1.2.3.
139. Id. ¶ 4.1.1.6.
140. Id. ¶¶ 4.1.1.9, 4.1.2.1, 4.1.2.8, 4.1.2.10.
141. Id. ¶¶ 4.1.2.11–12.
142. Id. ¶¶ 4.1.1.7, 4.1.2.1.
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This attempt at a balance between individual rights and
military neutrality can be observed in the Political Activity Directive’s
restrictions on retired personnel as well, albeit with a much higher
threshold for what makes a behavior too conspicuous. For example, DoD
logos cannot be used on political materials.143 Retirees who run for office
can mention their rank, component, and former title; they can even use
a military photograph, but it may not be the “primary graphic
representation” in any material and they must make their retiree
status clear.144 Should retiree candidates use this kind of military
information, it “must be accompanied by a prominent and clearly
displayed disclaimer” refuting the implication of endorsement by the
DoD or the applicable service component.145 Generally, however,
retirees may participate in most of the political activities prohibited to
active servicemembers, subject to a catchall provision that they do not
“otherwise act in a manner that could reasonably give rise to the
inference or appearance of official sponsorship, approval, or
endorsement.”146 Crucially, this prohibits the implication of
endorsement by the DoD, not endorsements by individuals.147
2. The UCMJ’s Punitive Article of “Contempt Towards Officials”
The other legal restriction that bears on political endorsements
by retirees is the UCMJ punitive article “contempt toward officials.” It
criminalizes the use of “contemptuous words against the President, the
Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a
military department, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the
Governor or legislature of any State.”148 It does not specify duty status,
and thus applies to retirees.149 Prosecutorial guidance issued by the
executive branch limits the applicability of this provision by requiring
143. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 5535.12, DOD BRANDING AND TRADEMARK LICENSING
PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION Enclosure 2, ¶ 2.d (Sept. 13, 2013).
144. DIRECTIVE 1344.10, supra note 136, ¶¶ 4.3.1.1, 4.3.2.1; see also Andrew Alan Pinson,
Note, A Bridge Too Far? Directive 1344.10 and the Military’s Inroads on Core Political Speech in
Campaign Media, 44 GA. L. REV. 837 (2010) (criticizing restrictions on candidates).
145. DIRECTIVE 1344.10, supra note 136, ¶ 4.3.1.2.
146. Id. ¶ 4.1.4.
147. See id.
148. 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2012). Two other UCMJ punitive articles known as the “general articles”
have bearing on political speech. These prohibit “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman,”
“disorders and neglects to the prejudice of the good order and discipline in the armed forces,” and
“conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.” 10 U.S.C. §§ 933, 934 (2012). These
offenses would be unlikely to encompass endorsements unless accompanied by extreme additional
facts, so I do not discuss them here. See generally Weber, supra note 117, at 108 (describing the
application of the general articles to political speech).
149. See 10 U.S.C. § 888; supra note 97 and accompanying text (explaining Congress’s
extension of the UCMJ to retired servicemembers).
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that the speech target officials in their personal capacity in order to be
chargeable.150 It also prohibits charging those who express contempt
towards officials not contemporaneously holding the specified offices,
even if the targeted officials may have held a specified office in the
past.151
III. CURRENT LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL CONSTRAINTS
FAIL TO DETER ENDORSEMENTS
This Part will explain why none of the legal constraints
discussed in Part II limit former flag officers from publicly endorsing
political candidates and why retirees would be unlikely to face
enforcement in any event. It concludes by arguing that professional
norms alone are not enough to solve the problem.
No statutory or regulatory provision constrains the standard
retired flag officer endorsement. At first glance, the Civil War
prohibition on officers using “military authority” to “influence the vote”
of servicemembers would seem to apply.152 The context of the statute
makes it clear, however, that “authority” refers to the specific ordergiving authority vested in the chain of command, not a general
credibility that could sway opinions, like the credibility of a former flag
officer.153 A contempt charge could hypothetically apply in the event
that a former flag officer uses vitriolic language to denounce an
incumbent opponent of her preferred candidate. Obviously, this would
leave most, if not all, of the typical endorsements untouched.
The catchall provision in the Political Activity Directive comes
the closest to a limitation. When an officer has reached the highest
ranks and held the most prestigious leadership roles, her endorsement
draws on institutional credibility and implies a kind of consensus
among the military establishment.154 Thus, one could argue that just by
nature of their unique rank and status, retired flag officers “could
150. See JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES pt. IV-21, ¶ 14(c) (2019), https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/Documents/2019%20MCM%20
(Final)%20(20190108).pdf?ver=2019-01-11-115724-610 [https://perma.cc/22SG-CR58] (“If not
personally contemptuous, adverse criticism of one of the officials or legislatures named in the
article in the course of a political discussion, even though emphatically expressed, may not be
charged as a violation of the article.”).
151. See id. (“The official or legislature against whom the words are used must be occupying
one of the offices or be one of the legislatures named in Article 88 at the time of the offense.”).
152. See 18 U.S.C. § 609 (2012).
153. The same sentence of the statute prohibiting the use of “military authority” to “influence
the vote” of servicemembers also specifically outlaws the use of this authority to influence
servicemembers to vote at all—by “requir[ing]” them to “march to a polling place.” Id.
154. See supra notes 11–13, 67–68 and accompanying text (describing the various sources of
an individual officer’s influence).
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reasonably give rise to the inference or appearance of official
sponsorship, approval, or endorsement” by the DoD or a service
component when they endorse a political candidate.155 Endorsers would
argue, however, that an inference of DoD endorsement would require
leveraging more explicitly “official” symbols like logos or uniforms. They
would cite the example set by hundreds of their predecessors over the
last few decades as an indication that they acted “reasonably.”
Even if the restrictions described above could adequately
constrain retiree endorsements, experience suggests that enforcement
against retirees would not occur. First, it is worth noting that military
commanders since Vietnam have exercised “great restraint in
employing the powerful tools at their disposal” to curtail political
speech—as they should.156 Active servicemembers have certainly
violated the Political Activity Directive157 and uttered contemptuous
speech,158 but courts-martial and nonjudicial punishments have been
rare, with commanders typically handling the problem via
administrative correctives like reprimands.159
Enforcement against retirees, while theoretically possible,
remains practically unlikely. To levy charges against a retired army
officer, a commander would need to demonstrate “extraordinary
circumstances” and obtain a referral from the Criminal Law Division of
the Office of the Judge Advocate General.160 The other service
components impose similar policies limiting the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.161 Practically speaking, this means retirees
almost never face court-martial proceedings, especially not retired flag
officers.162 The army did not court-martial a retired general until

155. DIRECTIVE 1344.10, supra note 136, ¶ 4.1.4.
156. Weber, supra note 117, at 114.
157. See STANDARDS OF CONDUCT OFFICE, OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, DEP’T OF DEF.,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL FAILURE 121–31 (2014), https://www.jag.navy.mil/distrib/instructions
/EncylopediaofEthicalFailures(2014).pdf [https://perma.cc/2HEE-KP6H] (documenting corrective
actions taken against recent violations of the Political Activity Directive and the Hatch Act).
158. See John C. Wigglesworth, Contemptuous Speech Against the President, AIR COMBAT
COMMAND (Oct. 21, 2010), https://www.acc.af.mil/News/Commentaries/Display/Article/203584/
contemptuous-speech-against-the-president/
[https://perma.cc/9FNW-AHVJ]
(describing
contemptuous speech cases charged under Article 88 and its predecessors).
159. See Weber, supra note 117, at 114–19 (explaining trends in the enforcement of restrictions
on military political speech, including Article 88 and others).
160. AR 27–10, supra note 69, ¶ 5–2(a)(3). The same policy provides that “[i]f necessary to
facilitate courts-martial action, retired Soldiers may be ordered to active duty.” Id.
161. Wigglesworth, supra note 158 (observing that, in the air force context, “if not personally
contemptuous, adverse criticism of one of the officials or legislatures named in the article in the
course of a political discussion, even though emphatically expressed, may not be charged”).
162. See Ives & Davidson, supra note 98, at 16–33 (surveying eight court-martials of retired
officers, two of flag officer rank, and twelve court-martials of retired enlisted personnel).
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1998.163 And the army’s 1918 court-martial of a former musician who
disparaged President Wilson represents the only contemptuous speech
court-martial against any retiree to date, and it resulted in acquittal.164
And of course, using a criminal prosecution to handle the
endorsement problem would be like bringing a tank to a bar fight. No
one critical of the practice has suggested that a criminal remedy would
be even remotely appropriate.165 But the way forward with a more
proportional administrative sanction is unclear. The existing
framework for postemployment ethical violations can presumably
handle violations of the Political Activity Directive by retirees, but
unless the retiree remains a part of the federal government and has a
new federal supervisor, there is no obvious initiator of administrative
sanctions, since she does not have a commander unless called back to
active duty.166 Civilian courts are not a viable option because no specific
penalties are provided by statutes, as is the case with procurementrelated ethics violations167 or conflicts of interest.168
Thus, theoretically available restrictions on retired flag officer
endorsements are either disproportionate, unlikely to be enforced, or
both. Most commentators assume that professional norms represent the
only realistic response. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Martin Dempsey asserts that it “is not something that needs to be fixed
with law, policy, or administrative rule,” and that the solution is simply
to “say no.”169 Political scientists James Golby, Kyle Dropp, and Peter
Feaver write, “[W]e are not suggesting the use of any legal coercion to
stop them,” and instead argue that “senior veterans [should] avoid the
prominent endorsements that have become increasingly the
norm . . . as a voluntary measure.”170 They observe that a “taboo might
already be emerging,” fostered by outspoken former flag officers

163. Id. at 24–25.
164. Id. at 25.
165. See infra Part V (cataloguing potential responses to this problem, none of which include
criminal sanction).
166. Cf. DEP’T OF DEF., DOD 5500.07-R, THE JOINT ETHICS REGULATION (JER) ¶¶ 10-100, 10200 (2011) [hereinafter JER] (explaining that the UCMJ is the mechanism for sanctioning “current
DoD employees” and mentioning specific statutes “that regulate the post-Government service
Federal employment activities of former or retired DoD employees” but not outlining a general
administrative mechanism applicable to retirees).
167. See 41 U.S.C. § 2105 (2012) (outlining administrative, criminal, and civil penalties for
violations of restrictions on obtaining and disclosing information relating to the federal
procurement policy).
168. See 18 U.S.C. § 216 (2012) (outlining criminal and civil penalties for the offenses of
bribery, graft, and conflicts of interest).
169. Dempsey, supra note 7.
170. GOLBY, DROPP & FEAVER, supra note 13, at 18.
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decrying the practice in an attempt to exert peer pressure.171 Certainly
Dempsey is not alone among his peers in broadcasting criticism,172 and
some retired four-star generals have reportedly tried to encourage
others to resist appeals from campaigns.173
Unfortunately, the evidence does not justify optimism that
professional norms will strengthen themselves without some kind of
intervention. Endorsers have acted in the face of criticism since the late
1980s, when the modern form of the practice began.174 And yet this has
not prevented the onslaught of former flag officers signing onto
endorsement letters and accepting public roles in campaigns.175 In fact,
some, like Hillary Clinton supporter General John Allen, actually lean
on the norm to posture themselves as followers of conscience that
simply cannot stay quiet due to an unprecedented sense of “crisis.”176
What prevents endorsers from arguing that every election represents
such a crisis?
The same reasons motivating past legal interventions and
current restrictions on the political activity of active and retired
servicemembers should motivate a novel legal response to the current
problem of retired flag officer endorsements. Unique among former
government workers, those receiving a military pension remain under
the jurisdiction of their former institution, and a major theme of the
Political Activity Directive acknowledges that the public perception of
retirees can negatively impact the military’s ability to remain apolitical.

171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Molly O’Toole, Ex-General to Top Brass: Stay Out of the ‘Cesspool of Domestic
Politics’, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 11, 2016, 7:53 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/11/ex-generalto-top-brass-stay-out-of-the-cesspool-of-domestic-politics/
[https://perma.cc/D7HC-V6PU]
(recalling an interview with John Kelly, a retired marine general (and future white house chief of
staff), who argued that the practice increases “mistrust” and that an endorsement “just becomes a
talking point on CNN” without convincing any voters); Dana Priest & Greg Miller, He Was One of
the Most Respected Intel Officers of His Generation. Now He’s Leading ‘Lock Her Up’ Chants, WASH.
POST (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nearly-the-entirenational-security-establishment-has-rejected-trumpexcept-for-this-man/2016/08/15/d5072d965e4b-11e6-8e45-477372e89d78_story.html [https://perma.cc/3XVN-729U] (quoting a statement
from Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen criticizing Flynn and Allen for
their “disappointing lack of judgment in [speaking out] for crass partisan purposes”).
173. Feaver, supra note 4.
174. For a historical example, see David Evans, Bush Ad Becomes a Political Minefield for a
Retired Marine, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 13, 1992), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1992-0313-9201230646-story.html [https://perma.cc/A84G-CJ2J].
175. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text (providing examples of endorsements from
the 2016 presidential campaign).
176. See Priest & Miller, supra note 172 (quoting Allen as acknowledging that “[r]etired senior
officers should not take lightly the impact of public commentary in a political environment” but
asserting that Trump would “create a civil-military crisis,” prompting him to speak out as a
“matter of conscience”).
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The current legal framework cannot effectively address the
endorsement problem, but neither can existing professional norms.
IV. ANTI-ENDORSEMENT LESSONS FROM OTHER CONTEXTS
In two nonmilitary contexts and one military but nonpolitical
context, the government restricts individuals from making or implying
endorsements. This Part first analogizes to codes of judicial ethics and
restrictions on civil servants. It then describes how military retirees
may not use rank or title to imply DoD endorsement of a private
business, and how they may not immediately attempt to influence the
official action of their former service component on behalf of a private
organization. Each of these examples offers lessons about how to design,
enforce, and justify provisions intended to deter or reduce the impact of
retired flag officer endorsements.
A. Judges
The U.S. legal profession began attempting to regulate judicial
ethics in the early twentieth century.177 Today, the vast majority of
federal judges178 must adhere to Canon 5 of the Code of Conduct for
United States Judges, which enumerates a prohibition against “publicly
endors[ing] or oppos[ing] a candidate for public office.”179 The American
Bar Association (“ABA”) Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which forms
the basis for most judicial ethics rules at the state level,180 contains a
nearly identical prohibition in Rule 4.1(A)(3).181 Significantly, the
federal anti-endorsement provision applies to judges who have retired
due to disability, retired into senior status, or retired but remain subject

177. See Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial
Elections, the First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 314–15
(2003) (“The American Bar Association made its first attempt at promulgating rules of judicial
conduct in 1924.”).
178. By this I mean essentially all Article III judges (but not the Supreme Court Justices) and
many Article I judges, including those on the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces. U.S. COURTS, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES 1–2
(2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/code_of_conduct_for_united_states_judges_
effective_march_12_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/LF9Y-7VD9].
179. Id. at 18–19.
180. See Model Code Anniversary, JUD. ETHICS & DISCIPLINE (Mar. 21, 2017),
https://ncscjudicialethicsblog.org/category/new-codes-of-judicial-conduct/ [https://perma.cc/THS9EYTL] (noting that “[m]ost states adopted the 1972 model code almost verbatim” and “30
jurisdictions have adopted new codes . . . that include many . . . 2007 model code revisions”).
181. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.1(A)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (stating that a
judge shall not “publicly endorse or oppose a candidate for any public office”).

7_Miller_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

1240

5/22/2020 7:18 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:4:1209

to recall.182 Similarly, a retired judge “subject to recall for service, who
by law is not permitted to practice law” remains subject to the ABA antiendorsement provision.183 Potential sanctions span from public
reprimand to removal.184
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld
Minnesota’s anti-endorsement provision in 2012 under strict scrutiny,
observing that even without actual bias against litigants, “the act of
endorsement itself undermines the judiciary’s appearance of
impartiality because the public may perceive the judge to be beholden
to political interests.”185 In 2010, the Seventh Circuit upheld
Wisconsin’s endorsement prohibition, though it arrived at that
conclusion by applying a balancing approach for government employee
speech.186 Like the Eighth Circuit, it found the risk of “undermin[ing]
the appearance of impartiality” significant.187 The court also found that
“the constitutional protection in a political endorsement is tempered by
the limited communicative value of such an endorsement.”188 In other
words, mere endorsements do little to broadcast the qualifications and
beliefs of a judge who is herself campaigning for office, which the
Supreme Court has found worthy of protecting.189 Instead, they mainly
boost the endorsee and suggest “an effort to . . . assume a role as
political powerbroker.”190
The Supreme Court has not considered judicial endorsements,
but in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, it upheld a restriction on judicial
candidates personally soliciting campaign contributions.191 The Court
182. Senior judges are those who have met age and service requirements, meet yearly
workload requirements (roughly the amount that an active service judge completes in three
months), and remain salaried. See 28 U.S.C. § 371(b) (2012). A judge “permanently disabled from
performing his duties” may fully retire from active service under 28 U.S.C. § 372(a). These judges,
along with “[a]ll other retired judges who are eligible for recall to judicial service (except those in
U.S. territories and possessions)” should comply with the entirety of the Code of Conduct except
some of the sections of Canon 4—meaning Canon 5 continues to apply. See CODE OF CONDUCT,
supra note 178, at 19–20.
183. See Application, AM. BAR ASS’N (2011), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/professional_responsibility/2011_mcjc_application.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BB7SNS4L] (explaining in Part II that retired judges fitting this description need not comply with Rules
3.9 or 3.8(A), meaning Rule 4 continues to apply).
184. MODEL RULES FOR JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT r. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
185. Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1025 (8th Cir. 2012).
186. Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 983–88 (7th Cir. 2010).
187. Id. at 986.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 984 (noting the “distance between an endorsement and speech about a judge’s
own campaign”); see also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding
that a canon prohibiting candidates for judicial office from announcing their views violated the
First Amendment).
190. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 984.
191. 575 U.S. 433, 437 (2015).
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emphasized that preserving public trust in the judiciary’s ability to
administer justice was a compelling state interest.192 “[T]he role of
judges differs from the role of politicians,” and even though judges may
successfully avoid favoring donors, the mere perception of favorable
treatment would erode public confidence, justifying intervention.193
Certainly a comparison between military officers and judges
should not be taken too far, because anti-endorsement rules as applied
to retired judges do not appear to have been tested in the courts, and
there are separate, additional imperatives for maintaining judicial
impartiality tied up in the due process rights of litigants.194 But the
drafters of the judicial codes of conduct understood that retired,
pensioned judges subject to recall maintain the ability to harm public
trust in the judiciary’s neutrality. Likewise, retired, pensioned military
officers—who are also subject to recall—maintain the ability to harm
public trust in the military’s neutrality. Just as judges must appear to
be impartial in order to dispense justice effectively, the military must
appear to be apolitical in order to serve the state effectively.195
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit’s skepticism regarding the
communicative value of mere endorsements applies with equal force in
the military context. A flag officer adding her name and rank to a
candidate’s list of endorsements, without more, does little to educate
the voting public about the candidate’s merits or the issues at stake.
But it does broadcast the flag officer’s desire to be a “political
powerbroker.”196
B. Civil Servants
Like judges, civil servants must temper their individual speech
in the service of an institution meant to be nonpartisan. In 1939,
Congress passed the Hatch Act, which subjected federal public
employees (and some state employees) to a wide array of restrictions on
partisan activities and which remains in force today, albeit somewhat
narrowed.197 Today, employees in agencies considered more sensitive—

192. Id. at 444–48.
193. Id. at 446.
194. See, e.g., Siefert, 608 F.3d at 984–85 (“[U]nlike restrictions designed, for example, to
regulate federal employees’ political activity, restrictions on judicial speech may, in some
circumstances, be required by the Due Process Clause.”).
195. See supra Sections I.A, I.B.
196. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 984.
197. See Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7326 (2012). The Hatch Act actually built on over fifty
years of rule development regarding the active participation of federal employees in political
campaigns. See Scott J. Bloch, The Judgment of History: Faction, Political Machines, and the Hatch
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like the Federal Election Commission, the National Security Council,
and the Defense Intelligence Agency—violate regulations implemented
under the Hatch Act if they “[e]ndorse or oppose a candidate for
partisan political office” in campaign materials “in concert” with the
campaign.198 Additionally, all employees, even those in less restricted
agencies, cannot use their “official authority or influence” to influence
an election by, for example, using their official titles or positions while
working with a campaign.199 The Office of the Special Counsel (“OSC”)
investigates Hatch Act violations, issues warning letters and legal
opinions, and brings cases in front of the U.S. Merit Systems Protection
Board.200 Sanctions include reprimands, grade reductions, fines up to
$1,000, suspension, removal, and temporarily banning individuals from
federal employment.201
Hatch Act restrictions have survived multiple constitutional
challenges at the Supreme Court.202 The Court has cited several
government interests at play. These include selecting civil servants
based on merit instead of political connections; enforcing the laws “in
accordance with the will of Congress, rather than in accordance with
their own or the will of a political party”; preventing leaders from
coercing subordinates to vote for or support particular parties; and
avoiding erosion of public trust in representative government.203 As
discussed above, deterring retired flag officer endorsements would
similarly discourage the selection of officers for senior military positions
Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 225, 230–36 (2005) (describing how the 1883 Pendleton Act marked
the end of the spoils system and tracing the substantive evolution of Hatch Act provisions).
198. 5 C.F.R. § 734.411(d) (2019).
199. 5 C.F.R. § 734.302(a), (b)(1) (2019).
200. See Your Role in an OSC Investigation, U.S. OFF. OF SPECIAL COUNS. 1 (2018),
https://osc.gov/Documents/PPP/Processing%20Complaints%20of%20PPPs/Your%20Role%20in%2
0an%20OSC%20Investigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LK7-7GAV].
201. See Eileen Ambrose, Campaign Rules for Federal Employees Get an Update, BALT. SUN
(Jan. 27, 2013, 9:55 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/bs-md-federal-hatch20130127-story.html [https://perma.cc/3S2J-WYFJ] (summarizing the new “menu” of penalties
available after the Hatch Act Modernization Act passed in 2013).
202. See, e.g., U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 551
(1973) (holding that various Hatch Act restrictions were not unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad); United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 78–82 (1947) (holding that
Congress had the power to enact the Hatch Act and affirming termination of a public employee
who had served as a poll watcher and a paymaster for party workers).
203. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 413 U.S. at 564–65. The Court cited a related rationale when it
upheld mandatory disclosure requirements for lobbyists in United States v. Harriss. 347 U.S. 612
(1954). To refuse would be to “deny Congress in large measure the power of self-protection,” it
observed, by allowing the “voice of special interest groups” to drown out that of the people. Id. at
625. Since the nation’s founding, civilian control of the military has been understood as
governmental self-preservation. Instead of a coup, the modern threat is the risk that military
leaders will prioritize their own interests over those of their civilian principals. See discussion
supra notes 34–41.
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based on political compatibility, strengthen the hands of civilians in
Congress and the executive branch over their military agents, avoid
potential corrosive effects when subordinates perceive themselves to
have disfavored political views, and fortify public trust in the
military.204
C. Business Ethics
Retired flag officers face a number of restrictions on their
employment activities beyond those that all officers must comply with
once they leave the service.205 For example, while retired officers enjoy
a broader privilege to use their previous rank and title than other
former servicemembers,206 DoD ethics regulations prohibit them from
using their military titles in the context of employment and business
dealings if doing so “in any way casts discredit on DoD or gives the
appearance of sponsorship, sanction, endorsement, or approval by
DoD.”207 Additionally, the more stringent “revolving door” prohibitions
for federal employees apply to retired flag officers—namely, they face
the prospect of criminal prosecution if they communicate with
employees of their former service component for the purpose of
influencing its official action.208 This “cooling-off” period applies even if
the retired flag officer was not “personally or substantially” involved in
the matter at hand.209 But it does not prevent retirees from giving
companies “behind-the-scenes” assistance.210 These observations
suggest that the statute primarily aims to temper the perception that

204. See supra Section I.B.
205. All separated officers face criminal liability if they perform certain activities for
nonfederal employers. See 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2012). For example, they may never attempt to
influence the government regarding a specific party on a particular matter that they worked on
personally and substantially when employed by the government. See 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
Regarding matters they did not personally work on but should have known were pending under
their responsibility during their last year of service, separated officers may not attempt to work
on those matters for another party for two years. See 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2).
206. See 10 U.S.C. § 772 (2012) (authorizing “retired officer[s] of the Army, Navy, Air Force,
or Marine Corps” to “bear the title . . . of [their] retired grade[s]” but not affording the same
privilege to nonretired officers or enlisted personnel unless they “served honorably in time of war”).
207. See JER, supra note 166, ¶ 2-304 (stipulating when retired military members “may use
military titles in connection with commercial enterprises”); see also 5 C.F.R. § 2635.702(b) (2019)
(explaining permissible usage of government positions and titles for executive branch employees).
208. See 18 U.S.C. § 207(c)(1) (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 207(c)(2)(iv) (explaining that the
prohibition applies to those previously employed in the O-7 (flag officer) pay grade).
209. Pre- and Post- Employment Restrictions for Separating and Retiring Air Force Personnel,
DEP’T OF THE A.F. GEN. COUNS. 13 (2016), https://www.safgc.hq.af.mil/Portals/80/documents/
gca/ethics/AFD-160727-002.pdf?ver=2016-08-18-110459-677 [https://perma.cc/3LDG-GVDU].
210. Id. at 7.
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retirees will use their influence to improperly benefit contractors or
lobbyists.211
Thus, regulatory and statutory business ethics restrictions on
retired flag officers reflect the logical understanding that these officers,
due to their high rank and visibility, are more likely to mistakenly
suggest that their former employer “endorses” a project or favors an
interest group. They are also more likely to generate public distrust in
government should they immediately cozy up to private entities that
stand to make a lot of money from the military. The same logic applies
in the political endorsement context. By nature of their high rank and
visibility, retired flag officers are more in danger of implying an
endorsement by their former institution, and their overt acts of
partisanship are more likely to degrade the public’s perception of a
politically neutral military.
V. POTENTIAL LEGAL RESPONSES
So far, this Note has summarized why the United States
requires an apolitical military, one subject to robust civilian control. It
has argued that the practice of retired flag officers endorsing partisan
political candidates appears to be worsening, represents a clear danger
to civilian control, and weakens military effectiveness. It has explained
that while retirees remain subject to military jurisdiction, the existing
array of statutory and regulatory restrictions on political activity
cannot adequately address the problem, and neither can professional
norms. Finally, it has analogized to judicial ethics, Hatch Act
prohibitions, and postemployment business ethics restrictions on
retired flag officers. Now this Note turns to potential legal responses.
This Part first outlines some general concerns: namely, how to
define “endorsement” and why any response would need to be framed
around the endorser, not the campaign or the candidate. It attempts to
situate the flag officer endorsement problem within some of the
Supreme Court’s highly deferential decisions involving speech that
could degrade military discipline and efficacy. The remaining Sections
explain and evaluate four potential legal responses.
First, the DoD and each service component could enact new rules
that would punish endorsers by blocking them from participating in
events and partnerships sponsored by that component.212 Second, the
DoD could update the Political Activity Directive to mandate that
should a retired flag officer make a partisan endorsement, she must
211. See id. at 13 (describing the purpose of the “cooling-off” period).
212. GOLBY, DROPP & FEAVER, supra note 13, at 20.
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simultaneously provide a series of strongly worded disclaimers. Third,
the DoD could update ethics regulations to prohibit the use of titles and
rank in conjunction with partisan endorsements.213 The disclaimer and
military title proposals would ideally be backed up by Congress giving
the OSC (or an entity within the DoD) clear statutory authority to refer
cases to the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board to conduct informal
adjudications with the ability to impose civil penalties.
The most legally justifiable solution would likely be some
combination of these three responses. While somewhat harder to justify
under the First Amendment, a fourth response is worth discussing: a
contractual promise that should officers be selected for promotion to
flag officer rank, they will refrain from endorsing any candidate for
partisan office for eight years after retirement.
A. Defining “Endorsement” and Targeting the Supply, Not the Demand
Endorsements represent political speech at the core of the First
Amendment’s protection.214 Of course, the majority of the retired flag
officers who engage in the practice do so by simply allowing a campaign
to publish their name and rank.215 Mere endorsements, without more,
have “limited communicative value” regarding the qualifications and
beliefs of the candidate, as the Seventh Circuit observed in the context
of judicial elections.216 The data available bears this out insomuch as
retired flag officer endorsements fail to affect voters’ decisionmaking.217
But what is a mere endorsement?
No matter the legal response chosen, defining “endorsement”
without violating the First Amendment would represent a significant
challenge. The definition needs to be expansive enough to prevent
simple workarounds but limited enough to avoid precluding meaningful
debate on issues. When considering a cap on how much individuals
could spend “relative to a clearly identified candidate,” the Supreme
Court avoided unconstitutional vagueness by interpreting the cap to be
“limited to communications that include explicit words of advocacy of

213. Cf. Corbett & Davidson, supra note 48, at 70 (“In the near-term, the most effective
restraint on political endorsements is the military itself.”).
214. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (“Political speech, of course, is ‘at the
core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect.’ ” (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343, 365 (2003) (plurality opinion))).
215. See discussion and sources cited supra notes 1–3 (describing flag officer endorsements
during the 2016 presidential campaign).
216. Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 986 (7th Cir. 2010).
217. See sources cited supra notes 13–14, 65.
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election or defeat of a candidate.”218 This language, focusing on
connection to a named candidate instead of policies associated with
those candidates, would be a good place to start in crafting a definition
of partisan endorsement aimed at deterring flag officers.
In terms of overall design, any legal response would have to
target the supply of the endorsements, not the demand. It would be
tempting to directly address the role that campaigns play in competing
to collect endorsements from former military leaders. But restricting
campaigns from soliciting endorsements or spending campaign money
on content featuring retired flag officers would stand on much shakier
constitutional footing. Putting aside the rights of the officers, these
options would certainly violate the candidates’ free speech and free
association rights. The Supreme Court has made clear that in the
context of congressional and executive elections, “[t]he candidate, no
less than any other person, has a First Amendment right to engage in
the discussion of public issues and [to] vigorously and
tirelessly . . . advocate his own election.”219
Soliciting and using campaign funds represents a form of
protected speech, and limitations beyond certain disclosure
requirements are frequently invalidated.220 The Court already looks
skeptically at quantitative expenditure limitations,221 suggesting that a
content-based expenditure limitation would be even less likely to
survive strict scrutiny. Restricting candidates from soliciting retiree
endorsements would also fail to achieve the intended effect. Political
action committees (“PACs”) and other supporters would quickly step in
to solicit and publicize these endorsements, sidestepping restrictions on
218. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7, 43 (1976) (per curiam). Of course, the Court went on to
find that the $1,000 expenditure cap violated the First Amendment, id. at 44–51, but its analysis
does not transfer easily to the proposals outlined in this Section. The cap applied to “all citizens
and groups except candidates, political parties, and the institutional press,” id. at 19 (emphasis
added), and implicated different state interests, see id. at 45–51 (rejecting “equalizing the relative
ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections” as a compelling state
interest and explaining why the spending cap was inadequately tailored to “prevent[ ] corruption
and the appearance of corruption”).
219. Id. at 52. The Court has distinguished elections for judicial office. See Williams-Yulee v.
Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 446, 1662 (2015); supra Section IV.A (surveying anti-endorsement rules
governing judges).
220. See, e.g., Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 744–45 (2008) (holding that
expenditure thresholds for self-financed congressional candidates constitute a facial violation of
the First Amendment); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57–58, 61 (invalidating limitations on campaign
expenditures but finding that disclosure requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 did not violate the Constitution when narrowly construed). See generally FED. ELECTION
COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN LAWS (2019), https://www.fec.gov/resources/cmscontent/documents/feca.pdf [https://perma.cc/XWU8-HMY5] (collecting and outlining federal law
on campaign finance and disclosure requirements).
221. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236–37 (2006) (invalidating Vermont’s statutory
limitation on the amount candidates for state office could expend).
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the campaigns themselves.222 PACs may currently make unlimited
election-related expenditures as long as they do so without consulting
or cooperating with a candidate or a candidate’s agent.223 Practically
speaking, a campaign-centric approach would also be hard to enforce.
While the evidence that a retired flag officer made an endorsement
exists in the public domain, evidence of endorsement solicitation by
campaign proxies would be nonobvious and purposefully obscured.
Restrictions on retired flag officers themselves would obviously
also need to withstand scrutiny commensurate to the form such
restrictions take, which the following Sections will explore. But these
restrictions could draw on a number of rationales unavailable to
restrictions on campaigns or candidates. First, as pensioned personnel
that face the possibility of being recalled to service, retired flag officers
continue to belong to their service components and continue to fall
under UCMJ jurisdiction.224 Many of the motivations behind political
activity restrictions on active servicemembers—the validity of which
has never been seriously challenged—apply with equal force to retired
flag officers.225 And while the DoD does not currently employ retired
flag officers, it still regulates their conduct to some extent because they
present much of the same risk of mistakenly implying an institutional
endorsement.226 A reviewing court might therefore choose to apply more
deferential balancing approaches to the First Amendment based on the

222. Ease of solicitation by proxy likewise dooms the suggestion by Golby, Dropp, and Feaver
that political parties might conclude “that the costs of the military endorsements exceed the
benefits,” leading to self-regulation. GOLBY, DROPP & FEAVER, supra note 13, at 20. They write:
“The campaigns could agree not to give senior military officers or veterans speaking roles at
conventions or in advertisements, negotiating the terms much as they negotiate the rules
surrounding the presidential debates.” Id.
223. See Making Independent Expenditures, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/
help-candidates-and-committees/making-independent-expenditures/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/8RHF-82NV] (“Individuals, groups, corporations, labor organizations and
political committees . . . may support or oppose candidates by making independent
expenditures . . . [which] are not contributions and are not subject to limits.”); id. (clarifying that
an “independent expenditure . . . [i]s not made in consultation or cooperation with, or at the
request or suggestion of any candidate, or his or her authorized committees or agents, or a political
party committee or its agents”); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310,
372 (2010) (finding that corporate expenditures on electioneering communications constitute
protected speech).
224. See discussion supra notes 96–110 (discussing the continued exercise of military
jurisdiction over retired servicemembers).
225. See discussion supra Section II.C.
226. See, e.g., discussion supra notes 154–155, Sections II.C.2, IV.B.
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idea that retired officer speech is like government employee speech227
or, more importantly, like the speech of active servicemembers.228
The Supreme Court observed in Parker v. Levy that “the military
is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society,” and
that “the different character of the military community and of the
military mission requires a different application of [First Amendment]
protections.”229 In other words, “within the military community there is
simply not the same autonomy as there is in the larger civilian
community.”230 This lack of autonomy is justified because the armed
forces rely on discipline and duty within the ranks,231 this discipline
allows them to effectively fight the nation’s wars,232 and either the
Constitution or institutional competencies demand that the political
branches—not the courts—should make judgments about how best to
regulate the armed forces.233
The Court’s reliance on these rationales when reviewing
constraints on military personnel has arguably created a “military
deference doctrine.”234 When applying this doctrine, the Court may
generate an entirely separate, more tolerant standard than it would
normally apply, or it may apply the relevant civilian standard but
“stack the deck” by emphasizing the importance of the government
interests involved or giving significant weight to the government’s view
of the appropriateness of the means chosen.235
For example, in Brown v. Glines, the Supreme Court upheld an
Air Force regulation that required airmen to get prior approval before
circulating petitions on base.236 The Court found that the regulation
227. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (balancing efficiency, workplace
harmony, and the proper performance of an employee’s duties against the employee’s First
Amendment rights).
228. See generally John F. O’Connor, The Origins and Application of the Military Deference
Doctrine, 35 GA. L. REV. 161 (2000) (describing three eras of Supreme Court jurisprudence
deferring to the military on constitutional questions). But see Pinson, supra note 144, at 848–54,
861–65 (describing rationales for the Supreme Court’s military deference cases and arguing that
none of them justify upholding restrictions on former servicemembers as candidates).
229. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743, 758 (1974).
230. Id. at 751.
231. See id. at 744, 759 (noting that there are “certain overriding demands of discipline and
duty” and that “[s]peech that is protected in the civil population may . . . undermine the
effectiveness of response to command” (citations omitted)); Pinson, supra note 144, at 850.
232. See, e.g., Parker, 417 U.S. at 743 (explaining that a separate military society is required
because “it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should
the occasion arise” (quoting United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955))).
233. See O’Connor, supra note 228, at 174–80, 259, 265 (describing cases utilizing these
justifications); Pinson, supra note 144, at 850–51 (summarizing rationales for the military
deference doctrine).
234. See, e.g., Pinson, supra note 144, at 848–54 (outlining the doctrine).
235. See id. at 852–53 (describing these two methods).
236. 444 U.S. 348, 361 (1980).
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“protect[ed] a substantial Government interest unrelated to the
suppression of free expression,” specifically, the military’s interest in
discipline and command authority, which are “prerequisites for military
effectiveness.”237 And in the earlier case of Greer v. Spock, the Court
even demonstrated a willingness to defer to restrictions on the political
speech of nonservicemembers if that speech would affect military
duties.238 Fort Dix regulations (in concert with an army regulation)
prohibited political demonstrations and speeches as well as the
distribution of publications on base without prior approval if such
publications posed “a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale
of [the] troops.”239 The Court upheld the installation commander’s
decision to prohibit several candidates from holding events and his
decision to evict civilians who distributed campaign literature without
prior permission.240 It ended its opinion with strong language about the
“American constitutional tradition of a politically neutral military
establishment under civilian control,” linking this to the observation
that “the military as such is insulated from both the reality and the
appearance of acting as a handmaiden for partisan political
causes or candidates.”241
Greer and Brown obviously implicate the use of government
facilities and platforms, a factor not directly present in the retiree
endorsement context. But they demonstrate the Court’s willingness to
adopt a more flexible approach to safeguard military effectiveness and
civilian control—even when the speech involved is core political speech
by those not on active duty. As previously discussed, deterring retired
flag officer endorsements would help shore up civilian control and
promote military effectiveness.242 It would increase the odds of civilian
leadership deferring to genuine professional expertise, reinforce trust
in the chain of command, and encourage a larger cross-section of the
population to volunteer for military service.243
Unlike the regulations in Greer and Brown or the criminal
provisions in Parker, however, this Note does not advocate a direct
prohibition or penalty. The next Sections will outline several potential
237. Id. at 354.
238. 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976); see also O’Connor, supra note 228, at 247–48 (observing that
Greer “extended the military deference doctrine” by deferring to policies of the executive branch—
previously, it had only deferred to congressional statutes—and by deferring “to the regulation of
military installations, even if those regulations may apply to civilians aboard such installations”).
239. Greer, 424 U.S. at 831 & n.2, 832–33 (quoting Fort Dix Reg. 210-26 (1968), Fort Dix Reg.
210-27 (1997), and Army Reg. 210-20, 5-5(c) (1970)).
240. Id. at 840.
241. Id. at 839.
242. See supra Section I.B.
243. See id.
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indirect remedies, predict their efficacy, and offer a preliminary look at
how military deference could interact with the applicable First
Amendment standards should a retired flag officer bring a challenge in
court.
B. Formalized Ostracism
Besides hoping for a stronger social taboo against endorsement,
political scientists Golby, Dropp, and Feaver suggest an indirect
enforcement mechanism: the service components could blacklist those
in violation of the taboo and block them from participating in “briefings,
mentoring assignments and other consulting opportunities” with the
active force.244 The authors argue that eventually, fear of this
formalized ostracism would deter potential endorsers.245 Certainly,
senior leaders that have retired from the military continue to maintain
strong relationships with those who remain on active duty, and
threatening those relationships could make some potential endorsers
think twice.
Unfortunately, this policy on its own would not deter the bulk of
retired flag officer endorsements. Effectively maintaining and enforcing
a blacklist would be difficult, considering the wide array of formal and
informal events hosted by units of every size. And even assuming
endorsers could be effectively ostracized from interacting directly with
active military units, other groups like think tanks, universities, and
nongovernmental organizations would happily volunteer to host and
engage with senior military leaders, giving endorsers and their
supporters plenty of incentive to perpetuate the practice.
On the plus side, this proposal would be relatively easy to justify
legally, as long as it was applied evenhandedly.246 The military need not
invite every retiree back to participate in these voluntary opportunities.
And to the extent that military installations and resources are involved,
Greer suggests that the services could prohibit participation by
individuals whose prior partisan endorsements suggest they present
the greatest risk of exposing active servicemembers to partisan
speech.247

244. GOLBY, DROPP & FEAVER, supra note 13, at 20.
245. Id.
246. See Greer, 424 U.S. at 838–39 (observing that the Fort Dix policy had been “objectively
and evenhandedly applied,” with no candidates from “any political stripe” evading it).
247. See id. at 840 (upholding base regulations that prohibited political demonstrations and
speeches as well as the distribution of publications on base without prior approval if such
publications posed “a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of [the] troops.”).
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C. Simultaneous Disclaimers and Restrictions on the
Use of Military Titles
A second potential approach would be for the DoD to update the
Political Activity Directive to mandate that any time a retired flag
officer makes a partisan endorsement (or causes a campaign or
journalist to publish one), they must simultaneously provide a series of
disclaimers, more strongly worded than those retiree-candidates must
adhere to.248 For example, the disclaimer could read:
This endorsement does not imply that my views are shared by the DoD, any of the
individual services, or any active duty military personnel. The DoD strongly discourages
partisan political endorsements by retired senior officers because it has determined that
they degrade professional ethics, reduce military effectiveness, and are easily
misinterpreted in ways that undermine the constitutional principle of civilian control.

Such a disclaimer might deter some retired flag officers from endorsing,
either because of the additional coordination required to include the
language, or because the language itself might reduce the intended
impact of the endorsement. For those that continue to endorse, the
public might receive the information more skeptically. On the other
hand, as soon as third parties pick up news of the endorsement, the
disclaimer language will likely disappear from the public conversation.
The same endorsers who already point to the professional taboo while
justifying their actions could garner additional publicity by arguing
that the stakes are so high that they simply had to speak out despite
the disclaimers.
Alternatively, or in combination with the disclaimer
requirement, the DoD could add a provision in the directive prohibiting
retired flag officers from utilizing their rank or former duty positions in
connection with a partisan endorsement, in campaign literature, or at
a campaign event.249 As previously discussed, existing ethics
regulations already address retirees’ use of military titles in the context
of employment and business dealings, prohibiting uses that “cast[ ]
discredit on DoD” or “give[ ] the appearance of sponsorship, sanction,
endorsement, or approval by DoD.”250 This proposal would simply
248. See discussion supra Section II.C.1. Typical candidate disclaimers today read: “Use of
military rank does not imply endorsement by the Marine Corps, or the Department of Defense.”
AMY MCGRATH, https://amymcgrath.com/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2020) [https://perma.cc/NF4D5VHV] (promoting the U.S. senate campaign of a retired marine corps lieutenant colonel).
249. This idea derives from a proposal by two retired army officers, who suggest that Congress
might “create civilly enforceable restrictions specifically prohibiting retirees from using military
titles in political settings.” Corbett & Davidson, supra note 48, at 70.
250. See JER, supra note 166, ¶ 2-304 (stipulating when retired military members “may use
military titles in connection with commercial enterprises”); see also 5 C.F.R. § 2635.702(b) (2019)
(explaining permissible usage of government positions and titles for employees of the executive
branch).
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import the restriction to the political context and make explicit that the
use of rank and titles by retired individuals who have reached the
highest levels of military leadership inevitably implies institutional
endorsement.251 This proposal also shares an internal logic similar to
the Hatch Act restriction on civil servants using “official authority or
influence” to sway an election, which would include using an official
title in connection with a campaign.252 The restriction hones in on
proxies for the institutional credibility that endorsers and campaigns
exploit. Removing these signals for why the endorsement should matter
might make the practice less attractive to both campaigns and the
retired officers themselves.
Like the disclaimer requirement, however, a limit on the use of
military titles could also be evaded. PACs and news outlets could do the
investigative work and provide the public with rank and previous job
title. And even if this proposal did reduce the use of military titles, it
would not reduce the impact of endorsements by retired flag officers
that have acquired significant name recognition.253
Nonetheless, these proposals would put some indirect legal
pressure on retired flag officers to think before they sign on to a
campaign. In combination with formally ostracizing endorsers from
military events, mentorship programs, and partnership opportunities,
the approach could reduce the overall number and impact of
endorsements and signal widespread institutional disapproval of the
endorsement practice, providing additional ammunition to those who
criticize endorsers for violating the professional taboo.
As discussed previously, however, investigating and penalizing
retirees for violations of the Political Activity Directive is typically not
practicable, since they do not have a commander to implement
administrative sanctions unless called back to active duty.254 Therefore,

251. See GOLBY, DROPP & FEAVER, supra note 13, at 19 (noting that flag rank makes an
endorser “qualitatively different” from other officers because “it seems likely that the broader
public would view his statements as ‘official’ even if he tried to claim they were his own private,
personal views”); id. (observing that flag officers were the “clear targets” of presidential
campaigns).
252. 5 C.F.R. § 734.302(a), (b)(1) (2019).
253. Cf. Paul D. Shinkman, 88 Generals, Admirals Pen Support for Trump, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Sept. 6, 2016, 9:23 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-09-06/88generals-admirals-pen-support-for-trump-but-lack-name-recognition-of-clinton-supporters
[https://perma.cc/LGB8-QJFC] (asserting that the retired admirals and generals supporting
Trump “lack[ ] the kind of name-branding of the former military leaders who support Hillary
Clinton” and that “[f]ew if any . . . have military experience that ma[ke] them household names”).
254. Cf. JER, supra note 250, ¶¶ 10-100, 10-200 (explaining that the UCMJ is the mechanism
for sanctioning “current DoD employees” and mentioning specific statutes “that regulate the postGovernment service Federal employment activities of former or retired DoD employees” but not
outlining a general administrative mechanism applicable to retirees).

7_Miller_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2020]

5/22/2020 7:18 PM

RETIRED MILITARY OFFICER ENDORSEMENTS

1253

to make a disclaimer requirement and title restriction more effective,
Congress would have to give the OSC (or an entity within the DoD) clear
authority to refer these types of cases to the U.S. Merit Systems
Protection Board to conduct informal adjudications with the ability to
impose civil penalties like fines.255 The Board already adjudicates
certain appeals from DoD civilian employees,256 and it already hears
Hatch Act cases,257 so its members would be able to draw on this
experience in determining whether a retired flag officer’s speech met
the chosen definition for “endorsement” and whether titles and
disclaimers were or were not utilized properly. For first-time offenses,
the investigating entity could send violators letters telling them to add
disclaimers or remove titles.
It is unclear how a reviewing court would evaluate a disclaimer
requirement and a restriction on the use of titles. Neither specifically
prohibits or penalizes the speech at issue, but a disclaimer like the one
above compels individuals to host government speech in a potentially
impermissible way,258 and both tools certainly put government pressure
on speakers to avoid exercising their First Amendment rights. The
Supreme Court sometimes finds this pressure problematic, such as
when it held that a state commission could not identify “objectionable”
books and write sellers discouraging their sale by tacitly threatening
police or prosecutorial action.259 But other times, the Court takes a more
lenient approach. In Meese v. Keene, the Court held that the government
could identify foreign films as “political propaganda” and require
exhibitors to project the label “political propaganda” prior to screening
255. This obviously assumes that the MSPB is staffed as intended, which has not been the
case in recent years. See Nicole Orgrysko, Senate Forces ‘First’ for MSPB as the Agency Loses All
Members, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Mar. 1, 2019, 10:49 AM), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/
workforce-rightsgovernance/2019/03/senate-forces-first-for-mspb-as-the-agency-loses-allmembers/ [https://perma.cc/QMD9-JAXK].
256. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEF., DODI 1400.25, VOLUME 731, DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: SUITABILITY AND FITNESS ADJUDICATION FOR CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES ¶ 7
(2012) (explaining that individuals applying for or serving in covered positions may appeal adverse
decisions about their suitability to the MSPB).
257. Jurisdiction, U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BOARD, https://www.mspb.gov/About/
jurisdiction.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2020) [https://perma.cc/J86R-H8J9].
258. Compare Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64–65,
70 (2006) (upholding a federal statute that required law schools to permit military recruiters,
despite the schools’ contention that it forced them to project a lack of concern about “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell”), with Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557
(1995) (holding that parade organizers could not be forced to include groups with messages they
did not desire to present).
259. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (holding that the Rhode Island
Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth violated the First Amendment when it identified
“objectionable” books, wrote to sellers urging them not to stock these books, and informed sellers
that the Commission provided local police a list of distributors and recommended obscenity
prosecutions).
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them.260 The Court found that the requirement “neither prohibits nor
censors the dissemination of advocacy materials.”261 Rather, it simply
mandated “additional disclosures that would better enable the public to
evaluate the import of the propaganda.”262 Disclaimers on partisan
endorsements by retired flag officers could be similarly justified.
Especially if combined with general deference regarding military
imperatives, these proposals would likely pass constitutional muster.
D. A Contractual Promise
The proposals in the previous Sections represent modest legal
responses that the DoD could act on relatively easily. A more robust
response merits some preliminary discussion: before military officers
could apply for promotion to the flag officer rank, they would have to
certify that should they be selected for promotion, they will refrain from
endorsing any candidate for partisan office for eight years after
retirement. I will call this “Wait for Eight.” A stricter version of this
proposal would clarify in the contractual provision that should the
retiree subsequently choose to endorse a candidate, she would face a
monetary penalty, just as violators face damages for breach of contract
in the civilian context. A contractual promise represents the best chance
at effectively curbing the most dangerous retired flag officer
endorsements but also raises the largest First Amendment concerns—
namely the specter of an “unconstitutional condition,” the contours of
which this Section will briefly sketch.
“Wait for Eight” would be more effective than disclaimers, title
restrictions, and formalized ostracism. Evading a specific contractual
prohibition through the use of third parties, though conceivable, would
require more creativity263 and would not be worth the risk for most
retirees, who could simply wait out the term and avoid risking a
violation. Additionally, as the waiting period passes, the would-be
endorser’s name recognition, association with recent national security
issues, and connection to senior military and civilian leaders would
fade, making a potential endorsement both less impactful and less
likely to be solicited.264 For example, a waiting period of eight years
260. 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
261. Id. at 478.
262. Id. at 480.
263. For example, retirees could band together and form an advocacy organization that
endorses specific candidates. Or the spouses of retired flag officers could endorse candidates. A
sufficiently nuanced definition of “endorsement” could likely preclude the former. The latter
presents less of a danger of implied institutional endorsement.
264. Cf. GOLBY, DROPP & FEAVER, supra note 13, at 18 (speculating that an endorsement from
a four-star general like Stanley McCrystal, strongly associated with a specific conflict and
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would ensure the completion of two presidential elections, meaning that
those abiding by the promise could not endorse a president that they
served for in uniform, or even anyone running against a president that
they served for in uniform.265 These characteristics popularize an
endorsement and enflame its damaging effects.266 In this way, a
contractual waiting period deters the most dangerous endorsements
and incorporates a logic similar to that of the secretary of defense
waiting period and the “cooling off” period in the business ethics
context. Creating a decision point for servicemembers at the cusp of
taking flag officer rank could also formalize an additional distinction
between these officers and those of lower rank, encouraging officers at
the threshold to recognize that their actions will carry an increased risk
of implying institutional endorsement.
Could a contractual postemployment waiting period survive
judicial review? Perhaps. Generally, the government cannot provide a
benefit on the condition that an individual forgo her constitutional
rights.267 Opponents would argue that the proposal represents a penalty
coercing individuals to forgo promotion or else give up their full right to
political speech after retirement. Should civil penalties be enforced,
these could also generate a coercive juncture: a retired flag officer would
have to decide if endorsing in spite of the contractual promise was worth
losing some of her pension.
A reviewing court adopting this frame would likely treat the
scheme like any other content-based restriction on speech and apply
strict scrutiny, placing the burden on the government to establish that
it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.268 The
presidential administration, would have a larger impact than one from four-star general John
Nathman); Bayne, supra note 48, at 42–43 (arguing that the prominence of an endorsement
depends on rank, public profile, frequency of the endorser’s previous interaction with the
president, proximity to last date of active service, and existing public perception of partisanship).
265. Presidents may only serve two four-year terms. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. No matter
when in the cycle an officer retires, two presidential elections will occur during the eight-year
waiting period. Any elections involving an incumbent that the officer could have served under
would therefore occur during this period.
266. For example, the proposal would discourage selection of senior officers based on
partisanship because administrations would assess less risk to a reelection campaign. Trust and
inclusion in decisionmaking would likewise improve if such a fear was addressed. Finally, those
that speak out after eight years of being away from the active service will more conspicuously be
posturing themselves as personally partisan, instead of pretending that they are continuing with
their duties.
267. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001) (holding
unconstitutional a statutory prohibition against using Legal Services Corporation funds on
representation “involving an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare system”); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (holding unconstitutional a California veterans’ property tax
exemption that required applicants to subscribe to an oath that they would not advocate the
overthrow of the government or advocate for a foreign state against the United States).
268. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
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government could cite several compelling state interests necessary for
civilian control of the military that are analogous to those justifying
restrictions on the political activities of civil servants269 and judges.270
It could argue that the scheme is narrowly tailored because it targets
the most dangerous population of military endorsers and would only
last for the amount of time in which the endorsements would be the
most damaging. The military deference doctrine might even help “stack
the deck.”271 Ultimately, however, the government would face an uphill
battle under this framework.
On the other hand, a reviewing court might choose not to frame
this as a coercive condition at all. Cases involving conditions on
individual rights frequently produce inconsistent results, with perhaps
the least amount of coherence in the subset of cases involving conditions
on speech.272 On occasion, the Supreme Court has instead framed
conditions on funding as “a legislature’s decision not to subsidize the
exercise” of the right.273 For example, in Regan v. Taxation with
Representation, it determined that the government’s decision not to tax
contributions to nonprofits could be conditioned on the organization
declining to use that money for “propaganda” or lobbying.274 Similarly,
the Court determined that Congress could condition federal funding for
family-planning services on providers’ compliance with regulations
prohibiting abortion counseling and activities that “encourage, promote
or advocate abortion.”275 Proponents for a contractual waiting period
269. For example, safeguarding public trust in the military’s nonpartisan nature. Cf. U.S. Civil
Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 563–67 (1973) (identifying the
selection of civil servants based on merit instead of political connections as a compelling state
interest).
270. For example, ensuring that top military leaders are chosen based on their technical
expertise, not their partisan sympathies. Cf. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444–48
(2015) (observing that even though elected judges may actually be able to avoid favoring donors
whose donations they personally solicited, the perception of favorable treatment could erode public
confidence in the judiciary’s ability to administer justice).
271. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (describing one way in which the Court might
apply the doctrine).
272. See Larry Alexander, Impossible, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 1007, 1009 (1995) (“Although some
parts of the metadoctrine [of unconstitutional conditions] may be theoretically explicable . . . I
think . . . that larger portions of the area, and particularly large portions of conditions on free
speech, cannot be theoretically rationalized.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1416–17 (1989) (listing holdings that appear to create inconsistencies).
273. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983); see also
Sullivan, supra note 272, at 1440 (describing how defining baselines determines whether a
program “penalizes” or “subsidizes”); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U.
L. REV. 593, 601–03 (1990) (observing that “generating the appropriate baselines from which to
distinguish subsidies from penalties is exceptionally difficult”).
274. 461 U.S. at 542 n.1, 546–51.
275. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 180 (1991). Medicaid may also decline to subsidize a
medically necessary abortion despite funding all other medically necessary pregnancy-related
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could argue that Congress similarly has the authority to promote
individuals—paying them and bestowing them with the institutional
weight and visibility of “general” or “admiral”—based in part on an
assurance that these endowments will not be used in the future to
degrade the military’s nonpartisan nature.276
It may simply be too much of a stretch to label present-day
employment at higher rank (or a retirement pension at a specified level)
a “subsidy” for postemployment political speech.277 Proponents could
potentially distinguish the proposal by its nature as an employment
contract. While the contours of the contractual provision would need to
be outlined by Congress,278 fashioning the waiting period as a
contractual promise instead of a statutory prohibition makes it more
like postemployment restrictive covenants in the private sector, such as
noncompete
agreements,
nonsolicitation
agreements,
and
confidentiality provisions. It could also be analogized to exclusivity
arrangements in product endorsement contracts signed by celebrities.
All of these curtail speech and activities that would otherwise be
permissible in order to protect legitimate business interests.279
Similarly, a contractual promise would curtail the otherwise
permissible speech of retired flag officers in order to protect the
government’s compelling interest in a nonpartisan military.
Ultimately, while an argument can be made to support a
contractual promise, its novelty and uncertain relationship to the
Court’s constitutional-condition cases suggest that it should be pursued
only as a last resort.

costs. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322–26 (1980); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474–75
(1977) (reasoning that a Connecticut regulation restricting funding for nontherapeutic abortions
did not represent “state interference with a protected activity” but rather “state encouragement of
an alternative activity” such as bringing pregnancies to term).
276. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of
Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989, 1002–03 (1995) (observing that the more
senior the public official, the less likely we are to object to her dismissal for criticizing the
president).
277. The Court’s recent emphasis on examining the “scope” of the federal program and
whether the condition defines limits outside of this scope could also be problematic. See Agency for
Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 214–17 (2013) (“[T]he relevant distinction
that has emerged from our cases is between conditions that define the limits of the government
spending program—those that specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize—and conditions
that seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself.”).
278. This would represent a significant change to the military’s promotion and personnel
management system and attempting to enact it at the agency level would be inappropriate,
especially considering Congress’s more involved role in the selection of flag officers. For example,
Congress authorizes the exact number of flag officers, as opposed to specifying percentages like it
does for other ranks. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 525, 526, 12004, 12005 (2012).
279. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (describing the
relationship between promises not to compete and “the promisee’s legitimate interest”).
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CONCLUSION
The United States requires a nonpartisan military, one subject
to robust civilian control. The practice of retired flag officers endorsing
political candidates appears to be worsening, and it represents a clear
danger to civilian control. It also weakens military effectiveness.
Retirees remain subject to military jurisdiction because they earn a
pension and may be subject to recall. But the existing array of statutory
and regulatory restrictions on political activity cannot adequately
address the endorsement problem. To date, most commentators have
suggested that shoring up professional norms represents the only
palatable solution. Unfortunately, professional norms have failed to
contain the growth of the practice.
Congress has historically found it necessary to enact legal
constraints on servicemembers—and retirees—when facing novel
threats to civilian control. And in other contexts—such as judicial
ethics, the Hatch Act, and business ethics for military retirees—
restrictions on endorsement speech have been justified by similar state
interests. As a first step, the DoD should consider restricting retired
flag officers who make partisan endorsements from partnership
opportunities with the active force. It should also consider creating a
strong disclaimer requirement for endorsers and expanding existing
restrictions on the use of military rank and titles to prohibit their use
in connection with a partisan endorsement. If these proposals fail to
diminish the growing trend, Congress should consider modifying
employment provisions so that those who take flag officer rank agree to
refrain from endorsing for some time after retiring. Certainly, the
partisan behavior of retired flag officers is only one element of a
complicated civil-military relationship. But it serves as a reminder that
while civilian control may be a fundamental constitutional principle, it
relies on measures beyond the Constitution to manifest and protect it.
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